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IRCICA Journal publishes articles on all aspects of Islamic civilisation, such as the history of culture, art, science, philosophy, literature, traditional handicrafts and archaeology. *IRCICA Journal* aims to preserve the tangible and intangible heritage of Islamic civilisation, comprising of its written, architectural, cultural and artistic forms.

IRCICA Journal welcomes previously unpublished manuscripts on manifestations of Islamic civilisation in different regions within and outside the Muslim world including the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia. The intellectual outputs are hoped to serve the needs of researchers specializing in the fields of history, cultural studies, sociology, architecture, international relations and anthropology. *IRCICA Journal* considers all manuscripts on the strict condition that they have been submitted only to *IRCICA Journal*, that they have not been published already, nor are they under consideration for publication or in press elsewhere.

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Editorial Office Contacts

All business and editorial correspondence related to the journal should be sent to the following address

IRCICA Journal, Alemdar Cad., No: 15, Bâbüali Girişi,
34110 Cağaloğlu, İstanbul, Türkiye

e-Mail: ircica@ircica.org

Tel: +90 212 402 00 00 Fax: +90 212 258 43 65

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Editorial

AS THE CULTURAL SUBSIDIARY OF the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, IRCICA maintains a multifaceted profile of scholarly activities to promote studies on Islamic history and civilization. In this context, the IRCICA Journal represents a crucial avenue to present some of the outstanding products of IRCICA activities focusing on Islamic history in various geographies; history of arts, sciences, architecture, literature; as well as issues of cultural heritage across the Muslim world. In this context, it is a distinct pleasure to present the ninth issue of the *IRCICA Journal* to the attention of global scholarly community. This special annual issue for the year 2017 includes three articles in English and four articles in Arabic that highlight crucial topics in areas that fall under the thematic focus of the Journal.

The first article of the English section, entitled "Islam in The Political History of Bathurst and Independent Gambia from 1800 to 2016", was written by Professor Aboubacar Abdullah Senghore, Former Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of the Gambia and Deputy Director General at IRCICA. The paper attempts to look at the influence of Islam in the political history of Bathurst and in independent Gambia by analyzing the activities of various Muslim groups, institutions, and individuals in the politics of this tiny but strategic and important island. It commences with a brief history of Bathurst, the political history of Islam in the Island, the influence of Islam and its institutions on the political, the socio-economic and cultural life of Muslims particularly women in colonial Bathurst. It also looks at the history and influence of Islam and its institutions in Banjul and the rest of the country from during the first republic, from 1970-1994, and through to the second republic, 1994-2016. This article clearly shows that Islam has always had an influence in Gambian politics and society long before the beginning of nationhood until today.

The second article, entitled "Southern Africa's Muslim Minorities: Scholarly Research and Bibliographical Reflections", is written by Muhammed Haron, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Botswana and Associate Researcher at the University of Pretoria. The article underscores the magnitude of reference texts such as bibliographies that serve the needs of researchers, academics and other stakeholders; principally those who pursue studies that focus on Southern Africa's Muslim communities. It intends to cogently illustrate to what extent these scholarly outputs—regionally and internationally— contributed towards the appreciation of an emerging Muslim Civilization in the Southern African region.

The third article, the last of the articles in the English section, entitled "Observations on the Relations of the Subcontinent Muslims with the Ottomans", is written by Professor Azmi Özcan from the Department of History, University of Sakarya, Turkey. The article broadly examines the relations between the Subcontinent Muslims and the Ottomans in a historical context, and in particular focuses on how this relationship evolved in the aftermath of colonialism with regard to the role of Caliphate in political affairs. The author starts with Muslim Turks' first entering into the Indian Subcontinent from the beginning of 11th century onwards with Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni and concludes that from that time on mutual relations became part of the histories of respective nations. Prof. Özcan argues that Sultan Selim's assumption of the universal Caliphate in 1517 gave a new dimension in forging mutual relations. As the Muslims in India lost their power against the Western colonizers they developed a kind of spiritual attachment to the Ottoman Sultan and the Caliphate which lasted until the end of Ottoman State. Hence, on every occasion the Muslims of the Subcontinent did everything they could morally and materially to help the Ottomans although they were desperate under European pressure.

The first article of the Arabic section of this annual issue, entitled "Aspects of Art and Architecture in the Umayyad State", was written by Dr. Afif Bahnassi, the former Director General of

Antiquities and Museums in Damascus, Syria, and the first head of the IRCICA Governing Board. The article deals with the manifestations and forms of the artistic and architectural heritage of the Umayyad State since it was established in 41 AH / 662 AD until it reached its glory and greatest expansion during the reign of Abdul Malik bin Marwan (685-705 AD) and the rule of his four successor sons. Indeed, the Umayyad State extended from the shores of the Atlantic and the Pyrenees Mountains westward, to the Indus River and Chinese boundaries eastwards. Thus, the caliphs built structures and edifices that reflect the greatness of the rule that dominates this vast geographical area, such as the Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, as an expression of the greatness of the State of Islam, and the splendor of Islam and the expansion of its power. Dr. Bahnassi argues that the spread of the Umayyads and their authority throughout the empire led to the interaction of Arab and Islamic culture with the culture of other civilizations and religions, which is reflected in their artistic and architectural heritage.

The second article in the Arabic section, entitled "Profile of the Military Configuration of the Abbasid State", was written by Dr. Ghaida Adel Khazna Katabi from the department of the Islamic Economics at the University of Jordan. The article discusses the policy adopted by the Abbasid State in the organization of the Abbasid army which relied on non-Arab elements. According to the author, many of the non-Arab elements proved proficient in cavalry and in the art of the war, and were, thus, incorporated into public institutions according to their competence, mainly the military institution, for they were considered as a fundamental element of the Abbasid society. The Abbasid State tried to organize the army according to its available means and managed to bridge the gaps and ward off the danger of neighboring powers, especially the Byzantines. Prof. Katabi argues that the army also played a role in establishing the caliphate within the Abbasid family and preventing it from being destabilized by revolutions and opponents. In this regard, the Abbasid State attempted to devise new systems

to protect the military institution, including the feudal system, to ensure the continuity of the army's livelihoods and thus to ensure allegiance.

The third article in Arabic, entitled "The Situation of Muslims in Andalusia After the Fall of Granada", was written by Dr. Mohamed Darraj from Algiers University II in Algeria. The author aptly describes Muslims' scourge after the fall of Granada, the last Islamic city in Andalusia, after being besieged for seven months. The King of Granada Abu Abdillah Gernati was forced by the siege to sign the Treaty of Capitulation of Granada in 1491 in return for the Catholic Monarchs' pledge to protect the properties of Muslims, not to harm them, to respect their religion and culture. However, a few years after the fall of Granada the Spanish revoked the treaty and their policy turned from moderation to the oppression of Muslims. Mosques were transformed into churches and Muslims were forced to convert to Christianity and anyone who refused to convert was either imprisoned, banished, tortured or killed. Muslims rose up in Granada in 1499 and in Almeria in 1500 but were unable to withstand the Spanish army. Then Muslims resorted to the Ottoman State and the Ottomans entrusted the task of saving the Muslims of Andalusia to the Beylerbeys of Algiers, Tunis and Western Tripoli, but this policy, despite its great importance, neither succeeded in protecting Muslim communities, nor in recovering Andalusia because of the multiplicity of fronts between the Ottomans and the European powers.

The last article of the Arabic section, entitled "Islam and Islamic Civilization in the Islamic Kingdom of Mali", is written by Dr. Murtada Saaduddin Al-Ameen Othman from the Faculty of Arts at International University of Africa in Sudan. The author discusses the Islamic Kingdom of Mali in Western Africa in the seventh century AH (thirteenth century AD), and its many achievements in the fields of trade and military affairs, after Islam became its official religion. The article also discusses the great role of religious scholars in encouraging the spread of Islam under their Muslim

kings, especially Mansa Musa, who was very popular and beloved among the Muslim community. This empire was extending from the Atlantic Ocean westwards, to the Borno State or Nigeria to the east, and from the south of al-Maghrib al-Aqsa (Morocco) northwards, to the Atlantic Ocean towards the south, consisting of five countries or territories: Mali, Ghana, Sosso, Tukulor, Koukou. Dr. Murtada adds that each of these countries was independent until the kingdom of Mali annexed all of them and established the Islamic Empire of Mali, after the fall of the Ghana Empire. Following family disputes, Mali gradually shrank and was limited to the area ruled by the Mandingo and the Muslims became prominent again with the emergence of another empire in Western Sudan, namely the Empire of the Songhai.

In the light of the rich scholarly contents of the articles we highlighted so far in English and Arabic, we are convinced that this Annual Issue of the *IRCICA Journal* will make a substantial contribution to the international scholarly community.

Halit Eren, Prof.
Director General, IRCICA

Islam in the Political History of Bathurst¹ and Independent Gambia from 1800 to 2016

Aboubacar Abdullah Senghore*

ABSTRACT

This article looks at the influence of Islam in the political history of Bathurst and independent Gambia by analyzing the activities of various Muslim groups, institutions and individuals in the politics of this tiny but strategic and important island. It commences with a brief history of Bathurst, the political history of Islam in the Island, the influence of Islam and its institutions on the political, socio-economic and cultural life of Muslims particularly women in colonial Bathurst. The study also looks at the history and influence of Islam and its institutions in Banjul and the rest of the country from the First Republic (1970-1994) to the Second Republic (1994-2016). In conclusion, the article clearly shows that Islam has always had a say in the Gambian politics long before the beginning of nationhood up to date.

* Prof., Deputy Director General, IRCICA.

¹ The territory that comprises The Gambia was demarcated between 1891-1905 as defined by the Anglo-French Convention of 1889. Prior to the demarcation, the British crown colony of Gambia comprised a few scattered settlements along the river. St Mary's Island (which became Bathurst and then was renamed Banjul in April 1973) was purchased in 1816 from the King of Kombo.

Introduction

The role of Islam in Gambian politics goes way back to the beginning of the early contacts between Muslim traders from North Africa and traditional African leaderships in the early 8th century. By the 1800s there were Muslim communities in almost all over the country. However, due to their tensions with the traditional African leaderships, conflicts erupted between the two sides which lasted for nearly half a century.² Within this period, there was a difference between the religious composition of Bathurst and the provincial regions which had political significance.³ Additionally, the arrival of colonization and Western education introduced a new phase in the approach of Muslims towards politics in Bathurst. It was at this time when Jihad as a defensive mechanism in Islam was no longer necessary; and the Muslims had to embrace politics to reposition themselves better and affirm their religious identity within the colonial Western structures.

Bathurst is an island situated at the mouth of the River Gambia. It became a British settlement in 1816 when the Colonial Secretary, Henry Bathurst, endorsed the establishment of a military garrison in the Gambia to consolidate British dominance along the River Gambia. Under the stewardship of Alexandra Grant, the King of Kombo, Tomani Bojang ceded the island to the British in return for an annual fee of 103 iron bars.⁴ The Island grew rapidly as a British merchant settlement along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. As a viable trading post it attracted many trading merchants in the early years of its establishment. The construction of offices by the colonial masters in the new settlement made the city the colonial headquarters of the territory for administrative purposes. Prior

² For a detailed picture of the Islamic Jihads in the Gambia see Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 196-99.

³ Arnold Hughes and David Perfect, *A Political History of The Gambia, 1816-1994*: University of Rochester Press, 2006, pp.24-26.

⁴ J. M. Gray, *A History of the Gambia*. 2nd ed. London: Frank Cass, 1966, p. 60.

to 1821 the settlement was politically under the control of The Committee of Merchants.⁵

The Committee of Merchants was however divested of any responsibility over the territory in 1821 by an Act of Parliament of the British government that vested the power of administration of the settlement in the Crown.⁶ Subsequently, the settlement was put under the authority of the central government in Sierra-Leone. As such, Bathurst had to depend on Sierra-Leone for its laws and judicial administration. On the administration of justice, a Court of Common Pleas was established in the city with a limited jurisdiction. More important cases however had to await the arrival in Bathurst of the Chief Justice of Sierra-Leone. This dependence on Sierra-Leone continued until 1843 when Bathurst became an independent crown colony.

Consequently, Bathurst was put under the control of a Governor, an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. This tripartite arrangement reflected the customary colonial structures of government as practiced in British colonies in West Africa. The Executive Council was to advise the Governor on the administration of the Government; while the Legislative Council was vested with the responsibility of law-making. As the latter was the only government structure which allowed African representation as early as 1881, it eventually became the major political platform throughout the colonial era. Nevertheless, the African members were appointed by the Governor until 1947 when elections were conducted. An island which started as a small military garrison soon attracted many settlers from the provincial regions across the country, from neighboring Senegal, Mauritania and other parts of West Africa.

⁵ Ibid, p. 322. (This Committee of Merchants ceased to show any interest in the settlement since 1783.)

⁶ Ibid, p. 323.

The History of Islam in Bathurst

The settlement pattern in Bathurst represented the diversity of different ethnic groups in the Gambia. The population increased steadily with a composition of different ethnic groups. In 1881, the Wolof population in Bathurst numbered only 829, and rose to 3,666 in 1901; while the Mandinkas were just at 189 in number.⁷ This period of the early history of Bathurst witnessed a steady flow of immigrants from various Wolof States, such as Saloum, Mandakh, Kajour, Bawal and Jolof, all of which now part of today's Senegal, into the new but rapidly growing city. The ethnic composition of the population of Bathurst was comprised of groups such as the Jola, Fula,⁸ Serere, Aku, Manjako and other Africans and Europeans. As the population increased so did the social and cultural landscape of the city.

The population increment of Bathurst should be understood against the backdrop of the religious wars that took place in the protectorate.⁹ The late 18th century witnessed an influx of migrations into Bathurst as a result of religious disturbances in the protectorate led by Foday Kombo Sillah and Foday Kabba Dumbuya.¹⁰ The religious disturbances persisted until 1901 when Foday Kabba was defeated and this signaled the end of attempts by Muslim jihadis of the time for Islamic reforms and revivalism as well as for greater role in politics in the Gambia through military confrontations against the colonial authorities. This defeat gave the British an impetus to declare the whole of the Gambia a British colony.

⁷ [Gambia Government] *Detailed Account of the Census of the Population of the British Settlement on the River Gambia, Taken on the 4th of April 1881*.

⁸ Charlotte Quinn, "A Nineteenth Century Fulbe State", *The Journal of African History*, vol. 12, issue 3, 1971, pp. 427-440.

⁹ These Islamic disturbances were spillover effects of the Islamic movements that were taking place across the Northern and Western Africa. Inspired by the success of these movements Marabouts across the country embarked on a reform against all non-Islamic communities.

¹⁰ J. M Gray, *A History of the Gambia* p. 388. His name was first recorded in a dispatch from Colonel O'Connor to Sir George Grey in 1855.

The end of warfare meant that many Muslim clerics could now travel from village to village and also to Bathurst to propagate and educate people in Islam. Displaced families sought refuge in the colonial city because *Soninke* villages and towns in the Kombos were all defeated by the Islamic jihadists. This migration brought with it a new class of settlers who later became Islamic clerics and scholars. Consequently, the arrival of these Islamic scholars and clerics transformed the social and cultural landscape of Bathurst. First, they opened informal Islamic education centers (*daraas*) where they taught children the Quran and Islam in general. It was these Quranic centers that eventually introduced young boys into early Islamic education. They also propagated Islam which eventually led to the proliferation of mosques across the city. Even after the establishment of the Muslim community, politics in Bathurst continued to be dominated by the few educated Africans who were largely Christians. However, this tide did not last long and the situation started to change drastically in the early 1900s when Muslims started to play active roles in politics. Since then the politics of Bathurst and the rest of the Gambia became increasingly dominated by the Muslims.

The influence of Islam in the political history of Bathurst cannot be underestimated. Islam has influenced politics in this tiny but strategically important island since its founding in the 18th century by the British. Throughout the life of Bathurst, different political actors have tried to influence policies of the city in their favor or interest. The Muslim community for instance which formed a large proportion of the settlement as of 1900, had to confront substantial challenges in order to obtain a seat in the Legislative Council; primary among those challenges was the low level of Western education in the Muslim community of Bathurst. The urge for wider political representation led to the establishment of political groups on sectarian lines.

The Muslim community had its first representative in the Legislative Council as early as 1922 when Ousman Jeng became a member of the Council until replaced by Sheikh Omar Eye in 1932. Since then, the Muslim community presented an

overwhelming front in both the colonial politics and the struggle for independence.

A close study of the Muslim community in Bathurst politics reveals that they never advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state, neither were they calling towards having *Shariah*¹¹ as the source of law and justice in colonial Bathurst. Rather they were only content with a representation in the Legislative Council. This is because the Muslims of this period were, probably, not exposed to the modern day ideals of political Islam and Islamic governance. To that end, the Muslim community sought a Muslim appointment in the Legislative Council through the political process. Their desire came to materialize when Ousman Jeng was appointed to the Council in 1922 by Governor Armitage. Governor Armitage had been a commissioner for the northern territories of the Gold Coast before he became a governor in the Gambia in 1920. However, as discussed below the Muslim leaders in Bathurst, out of their Islamic consciousness, demanded for an Islamic court system to resolve their disputes and this demand was later granted by the British government.

Before Governor Armitage appointed a member of the Bathurst's Muslim community to the Legislative Council, he consulted the protectorate chiefs in the political process.¹² Momadu N'jai, the then Imam of Bathurst and the Committee of Bathurst Muslims all supported Jeng's appointment, who later became the first prominent Muslim politician in Bathurst. He remained in the Legislative Council until he lost his seat to Sheikh Omar Fye in 1932 as a result of a division within the Muslim community. The response of the colonial government towards this conflict was very moderate as they had no formally written colonial policy towards Islam.

¹¹ For broad understanding of political Islam in Africa see: Aziz Batran, *Islam and Revolution in Africa*, Brattleboro, Vermont: Center for Arab and Islamic Studies, 1983. See also Ali A. Mazrui, "Islam, Political Leadership, and Economic Radicalism in Africa", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 9, April 1967, pp. 274-91.

¹² Perfect and Hughes, pp. 94-106.

Momodou Jahumpa who was a very influential personality in Bathurst opposed Jeng's re-nomination in the Legislative Council in 1927, as he also strongly questioned the legitimacy of the Imam of Bathurst of the time. Consequently, he sought an injunction in the court to stop the imam from officiating in the mosque when he condoned Jeng's marriage to a woman he had a child with out of wedlock. The Supreme Court however declined the application stating it had no power to intervene in religious disputes. This Supreme Court decision speaks volumes about in deference and lack of interest on the part of the colonial administration towards preserving the image of Islam and the unity of Muslims as a dominant group in Bathurst and the rest of the colony. It was very evident that the British government had no official Islamic policy towards their dealing with the Muslim community. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in today's Gambia, where there are policies and formal institutions functioning to serve and protect the interest and image of Islam and ensure unity among Muslims and their various organizations and institutions.

In 1929 it became very obvious that Jeng was losing popularity with key personalities in the Muslim community. The division went unabated until Jeng lost his seat in the Legislative Council in 1932. It was not only the Muslim community that was against Jeng; Edward Francis Small, a prominent Christian from the Aku ethnic group, was an ally of the Jahumpa faction. His alliance with certain Muslim groups and personalities started in 1929 when he helped to found the first Gambian trade union, the Bathurst Trade Union (BTU). The trade union was for artisans, whose leader was Jahumpa, and members of E.F. Small's Christian associates. In 1935 reconciliation was effected between M. Jahumpa and Jeng. This reconciliation process was led by E.F. Small and subsequently a Muhammedan Society was also established comprising M. Jahumpa, Ousman Jeng and Imam Omar Sowe.¹³ Consequently

¹³ According to an official correspondence GA CI1268/1929, from Denham to Secretary of State, suggests that E. F. Small might have started this process in 1929.

the tides changed against Sheikh Omar Fye who was serving as a Legislative Council member. The early 1900s marked a significant turn of events in the politics of Bathurst as it witnessed the dominance of Africans in the local politics. This was possible due to the alliance between the Christian and Muslim communities in Bathurst.

The Christian and Muslim alliance for political purposes started in the early 1930s to challenge a dominant political front that had dominated the local politics since 1886. This dominant political front was led by an affluent Aku family, the Foster family.¹⁴ S.J. Forster was the first African member on the Legislative Council where he remained until his death in 1906. After his demise, his son Samuel John Forster succeeded him on the Council until his death in 1940. The death of the young Forster brought a close to the political dynasty of the Forster family. Throughout their tenure, E.F. Small allied with the Muslim communities to challenge them by forming trade unions for political purposes. Due to this alliance, E.F. Small won the first ever Legislative Council Elections in 1947.

However, it was not until in the late 1940s that party politics started in the Gambia. Prior to that period most political actors in Bathurst were operating on the platform of some kind of political organizations different from political parties. These political organizations had no rigid structures; they were rather mobilized occasionally to achieve specific purposes or reforms. For instance, the Bathurst Rate Payers Association (RPA) that won the first ever Legislative Council elections in 1947 was by no means a reflection of a political party. In the 1951 Legislative Council elections, the formidable political party, Gambia Democratic Party (GDP) won. Before the 1954 elections two more political parties were formed including the Gambia Muslim Congress (GMC). This period witnessed a significant transition in political organizations as political fronts were brazing up to control the decolonization

¹⁴ Forster Samuel was born in the 1840s.

process which eventually led to self-governance and independence in the colony of the Gambia.

Here mention can be made of Banjul Young Muslims Society (BYMS) which was formed as early as 1936. This organization was an offshoot of the Muhammedan Society that was revived into a political party in 1952 by Garba I.M. Jahumpa, a son to Mamadou Jahumpa. He was born in Bathurst in 1912 and attended Muhammedan School and later St. Augustine's High School on Government Scholarship. His contributions in Gambian politics cannot go unnoticed, particularly his call for reforms during the colonial era. He advocated for the education of the Muslims for participation in the domestic affairs of the country. As political organizations proliferated the 1954 Legislative Council Elections was well contested.

The 1954 election was the third Legislative Council Elections, and four candidates competed for only three seats in Bathurst. The candidates were: J.C. Faye, I.M. Garba Jahumpa, P.S. Njie and G.C. Joof. Three of these contestants, were leading political parties: Faye led the Gambia Democratic Party (GDP), Garba Jahumpa, the Gambia Muslim Congress (GMC) and P. S. Njie, the United Party (UP). The GMC which was founded in 1952 was an embodiment of around forty Muslim Organizations. But the most substantial composite of the party was the Banjul Young Muslims Society (BYMS).¹⁵ The new party's support was drawn exclusively from Muslims, and particularly from the Muslim Wolof. It also received the support of the then Imam Mama Bah of Bathurst and Sheikh Omar Fye. The formation of a Muslim political party marked an important turn in the participation of Muslims in Bathurst politics. This gave them the platform for political participation as the party was determined to end the discrimination faced by Muslims in the enjoyment of educational and other facilities including appointments into high positions of responsibility in government.¹⁶

¹⁵ Perfect and Hughes, p. 123.

¹⁶ Perfect and Hughes, p. 123.

The Muslims who were resistant to western education by 1921 had established a vibrant school in Bathurst called the Muhammedan School. This school became the center of education for the children of prominent Muslim families that eventually nurtured the founder of the Gambia Muslim Congress. The main objective of the party was to assure the Muslim community of greater access to government and the civil service which was dominated by the minority Christians due to their being favored by the British colonial administration plus their superior level of Western education.¹⁷ With that objective in mind the party became a platform to promote the interest of the Muslim community in Bathurst. However, the party enjoyed little support outside of Half Die, a suburb or district of Bathurst and Garba's stronghold, due to its Islamic identity. The most important thing was that the GMC leadership was of the view that the establishment of a strong foothold in the colonial politics could only be achieved through the electoral process. This belief was probably premised on the fact that there were no alternate venues for political agitation. To that end, Islam evidently influenced the political landscape in Bathurst and it helped Muslim political leaders meet political ends. Though a predominantly Muslim society, the people of Bathurst did not to a large extent endorse sectarian or identity politics; rather, ethnic solidarity was more evident.

Subsequently in 1957 the Protectorate People's Party, the PPP, was also established in Bathurst. The party merged with a predominantly provincial organization called the *Lillahi Warasulli* Society (For God and His Messenger Society) formed by Sanjally Bojang who later became a prominent figure in Gambian politics and commerce. The purpose of the society was not initially political; it was a social organization for the provincial Muslims residing in Banjul. The merger enhanced the status of PPP in the Muslim community. Such political alliances were not uncommon. Gambia

¹⁷ Jacob K. Olupona and Sulayman S. Nyang (eds.), *Religious Plurality in Africa: Essays in Honour of John S. Mbiti*, De Gruyter, 2013, p. 251.

Muslim Congress had allied with GDP for a formidable political alliance against the PPP which also appealed to many Muslims. As such, a comprehensive analysis of politics in Bathurst cannot be discerned from the influence of Islam.

The party's leader became Dawda Jawara. He was born in 1924 to a conservative Muslim trader and farmer from Barajally in the Central River Region, formerly called Macharthy Island Divison. He spent his childhood in Bathurst in a prominent Muslim family and attended Muhammedan School where he was a student of I.M. Garba Jahumpa. It was his party that eventually led the country to independence and self-governance. However, due to its appeal to the protectorates it was unable to amass much support in Bathurst. For a wider political representation the party had to be renamed from Protectorate People's Party to People's Progressive Party. Coincidentally, in 1958 E.F. Small died marking an end of the Christian pact as a substantial political force in Bathurst. After his death the Aku community ceased to produce any prominent politician; yet they continued to play influential roles in the civil service.¹⁸

With the country wide extension of the franchise in 1962, the PPP became a very powerful political front. The party started brushing shoulders with well experienced parties in the local politics. Eventually the party won the 1962 elections with an unprecedented majority.

The victory of the PPP in the 1962 elections and the subsequent independence of the country introduced a new phase with respect to the influence of Islam in the politics of Bathurst as the political landscape of the city had already attained maturity and diversity. Surprisingly though Gambia is a predominantly Muslim country yet the internal or self-government's policy did not fundamentally differ from the policy of their predecessor towards Islam. The government's external recognition and praises for its respect for

¹⁸ Perfect and Hughes, see chapter 6 "The 'Green Uprising': The Emergence of The People's Progressive Party, 1959-65" and pp. 67-70.

human rights might have diverted its attention towards religion in general and major domestic affairs. Largely due to the latter, the PPP government became insecure in the midst of opposition by radical factions against the status quo of official corruption, neglect of important sections of the political community and massive underdevelopment.

Post independent Gambia witnessed a surge of ideological and economic dimensions of radical oppositions. Radical movements were organized by urban youths who were influenced by radical political and economic thoughts fanning across the African continent and further fueled by the domestic realities of the country.¹⁹ Most of the radical youths were inspired by the pan-African rhetoric of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana as his political ideology offered disaffected young Gambians a compelling alternative to their country's underdevelopment. Nkrumah offered scholarships to young Gambians at that time to study at the Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Winneba in Ghana. These scholarships were administered by I. M. Garba Jahumpa who first met Nkrumah in 1945 at the Pan-African Congress. Overall, Islam and its institutions deeply influenced the political landscape and process in Bathurst during the late 19th and 20th centuries.

Let us now examine the influence of Islamic system of justice on the political landscape and the socio-cultural life of the people of Bathurst and the protectorate at large throughout the 20th century.

The Influence of Islamic Courts on the Political, Socio-Economic and Cultural Life of Muslims in 20th Century Bathurst

The Islamic society in the first half of the 20th century witnessed the establishment and increasing influence of a good number of

¹⁹ Perfect and Hughes, see chapter 8, "Radical and Insurrectionary Political Challenges, 1965-81".

Islamic and Muslim institutions in Bathurst and the other parts of the protectorate. These institutions included, the Bathurst Mosque, the Gambia Muslim Congress, the Banjul Young Muslims Society, the Muhammadan School, Lillahi Wrasouli Society, the Protectorate People's Party, the Peoples' Progressive Party and the Bathurst Muslim Court or the Qadi Court. There were several other organizations and institutions as well and all of them had in one way or the other influenced the political, social, economic and cultural life of Muslims and the Islamic society in Bathurst and the colony in general. However, the most important of all these institutions, which most profoundly had an impact on the life of Muslims, particularly women, in Bathurst and the rest of the colony and has so far survived the test of time is the Islamic court system, known as the Qadi Courts. Established by the British government in 1905, in response to strong demands by the Muslim elders of Bathurst, the Islamic court system hugely influenced the life of Muslims in the city and its surroundings as they went through broad cultural, socio-economic and political transformation. The moment it started operations, the new court led to the evolution of Muslim women's understanding of the importance of law in preserving their dignity as human beings and in securing their marital rights and interests. They had effectively used the Qadi Court to fight for and eventually achieved greater recognition and rights in the domestic sphere. There are plethora of cases in which the Qadi Court consistently enforced the women's rights to property ownership such as land ownership, inheritance right, their right to negotiate patriarchal relationships, to free themselves from abusive husbands and from untenable marital relationships and many more.²⁰ On the other hand, the court which was created to essentially deal with matters of family law, in an Islamic way, in a society largely dominated by Muslims, succeeded in securing a very important socio-economic and political objective of the colonial government, that is to control

²⁰ Bala Saho, *Contours of Change, Women, and Islamic Society in Colonial Bathurst, the Gambia, 1905-1965*, Michigan State University Press, 2018, pp. 1-10.

people's behavior. By controlling families and family relations in the Muslim community of Bathurst, the court was able to control the behavior of members of the vast majority of the population and this was a key policy objective of the colonial authorities. The British government was keenly interested in regulating domestic relations among the local population to ensure effective maintenance of law and order and peaceful environment, which was necessary for them to promote and maintain stable workforce. With peace and stability and maintenance of law and order fully ensured in Bathurst and throughout the colony, people had the opportunity and real chances to go about their businesses, to go to work, to do business, to establish and run economic, social and political organizations and programmes that had improved their living conditions and ensured their full and effective participations in the political process. This clearly shows how this Islamic institution had immensely contributed to improving the political and socio-economic development of the people of Bathurst. For the Muslim elders and their community throughout the country, the Islamic court provided them the opportunity not only to regulate, but also to preserve and protect the institution of marriage as sanctioned by Islam.

Although the territorial jurisdiction of the court mainly served the residents of Bathurst, but by virtue of its subject matter jurisdiction, the Islamic court has always dealt with matters from different parts of the protectorate, which later became the independent sovereign republic of the Gambia. During the life span of the First Republic, 1970-1994, the Jawara administration opened another Qadi Court in the Kanifing Municipality to ease the increasing pressure on the original court in Banjul. As for the Second Republic, 1994-2016, the Jammeh administration, which paid a huge attention and made enormous efforts to promote, empower and expand the influence and authority of Islam and Islamic institutions in the Gambia, increased the number of Qadi Courts from two to nine as new courts were opened in Bundung, Birkama, Farafenie, Mansakonko, Janjangborre and Basse. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Islamic Court system was

enhanced and further consolidated by the Jammeh administration with the establishment of a Shariah appeal court, which ended the jurisdiction of the higher courts of the conventional system to entertain appeals from the Islamic courts. Finally, since the establishment of the first Islamic court in Bathurst in 1905 to date all courts are managed and presided over by Muslim judges or *qadis* who are well educated and highly qualified in Shariah or Islamic law and they function freely without any interference from the conventional system or central government. It is however, important to clarify at this juncture, that long before the introduction of Islamic system of justice in colonial Gambia by the British government in 1905, Islam and Islamic jurisprudence were central to the life and to the judicial culture of the local communities throughout the Gambia. Traditional rulers and community leaders used to apply and enforce Islamic law. In 1893, a travelling commissioner, who successfully claimed exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes, reported that the protectorate people had it as a culture that all complaints were to be made to the Alkadie or Alkalo [village head], who holds courts or councils and orders offenders to be punished according to Islamic law. But now that the travelling commissioner had arrogated the power to adjudicate all local disputes to himself, the traditional rulers could no more apply Islamic law. This shows the important role the law played in defining relations of power during the days of colonial rule, as it strategically empowered rulers to command and demand, while obliging the colonized people to unconditionally obey and comply. Law was therefore, and perhaps still is, a governing instrument as it is used to regulate and control behavior and to define the relations of power.²¹ Let us return to and consider the situation of Islam and its influence on people's life in the First Republic, between 1970 and 1994.

²¹ For more details about the influence of Islamic courts and other Islamic institutions on the life of Muslims in the 20th century Bathurst see, Bala Saho, *Contours of Change, Women, and Islamic Society in Colonial Bathurst, the Gambia, 1905-1965*.

A Brief History of Islam and its Influence on People's Life, the Education System and Diplomacy of the Independent Gambia, 1970-1994 [The First Republic]

According to a survey conducted in the 1950s, the Gambia had the highest percentage of Muslims in West Africa.²² This highlights the important role which Islam could play in shaping the political history of the Gambia. Accordingly, in the 1950s onwards, Gambian Muslim parties and pressure groups called for a greater participation of Muslims in the education sector and thus for the establishment of more Muslim schools in Banjul and the rest of the country. This was a wakeup call for the Jawara administration not only to allow for the establishment of more Muslim schools, but also for the government to give their schools the necessary recognition and support equivalent to the Christian schools established in the colonial era. This gave birth to the establishment of Islamic schools in both Banjul and other towns in the provinces. Apart from the proliferation of Islamic schools throughout the Gambia, most of which adopted the Arabic language as a medium of instruction, the Jawara administration made it mandatory for all schools in the Gambia, public and private including Christian schools, to include Islamic studies and Arabic language in their curricula. Consequently, Islamic studies and Arabic language teachers were trained, recruited and posted to all schools across the country by the Ministry of Education, Youths, Sports and Culture. This very important and good legacy of the First Republic, 1970-1994, was maintained, reinforced and expanded upon by the government of the Second Republic, 1994-2016. Today, there are all levels of Islamic education institutions in the Gambia, ranging from basic through secondary to tertiary levels. Some of these institutions still adopt Arabic, while others are using English as medium of instruction, there are also institutions that are bilingual as they use both languages to transmit knowledge to students. Additionally, a very

²² Marloes Johnson, *Islam, Youth and Modernity in the Gambia*, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 39.

large number of Gambian Muslims and even non-Muslims in some cases, have studied and continue to study both conventional and Islamic sciences in colleges and universities of different Muslim countries and Islamic universities across the Islamic World and beyond on the sponsorship of Muslim or Islamic organizations, governments and individuals. This generation of young educated Gambian men and women produced in various Muslim countries and Islamic universities or in foreign universities or non-Muslim countries but sponsored on an Islamic ticket are today effectively contributing their respective quotas to various sectors of national development in different capacities and at various levels across the length and breadth of the country.

Against this backdrop, for any leader to win popular support in the Gambia, an affirmation of Muslim identity is key as the vast majority of Gambians are Muslims and this facilitates for a greater role of Islam in Gambian politics. It was as a result of this Islamic political reality on the ground that the former president and founder of the First Republic Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara received substantial pressure from the PPP party leaders and religious pressure groups to revisit his personal life and put his house in order. This is because, Sir Dawda, who was born a Muslim from a very conservative and deeply religious Muslim family, converted to Christianity and married to a Christian woman. What further complicated matters for Jawara in this case was that he came from the Mandinko ethnic group, which is a very conservative and deeply religious Muslim community in the Gambia and one of the first African tribes to embrace Islam in West Africa. Thus, this situation put a huge pressure on Sir Dawda and, as many argued, he had to return to his original religion and marry a Muslim wife as well. He was subsequently convinced to return to Islam. In 1968,²³ President Jawara married Lady Chilel Njie, a Muslim and daughter of a wealthy, highly respected and very influential Bathurst businessman.

²³ *Dictionary of African Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 200.

The marriage of Jawara to Chilel in particular, was purely based on both political and financial reasons. On political grounds, as is intimated above, he received a lot of pressure from his party leaders and the Mandingo Muslim society who constituted about 41 percent of the population. After the marriage to Chilel, his Party, the PPP gained popular support from Bathurst. It is reported that both the Imam of Bathurst and his deputy joined the PPP. This was a substantial booster for the popular support of the PPP. Furthermore, Chilel's father was wealthy and he helped fund the development of the PPP. Financially, the PPP gained a strong ground as it continued to receive sponsorships from the president's father-in-law, who was a very successful businessman and an influential Muslim community leader in Bathurst. As shown below, the Jawara government used a similar strategy and established Islamic collaborations with the outside world to fund projects in the country. Jawara used his marriage to Chilel as a means to reach further into the hearts of Gambians. The PPP gained significant allegiance from the Muslims of Banjul owing to this marriage as was revealed by the joining of the Imam of Banjul and his deputy to the PPP politics. There were clear indications that all the Muslim society under the Imam of Banjul followed him to the PPP as Jawara won significant support and almost all elections in the capital city.

On the diplomatic arena, it should not be forgotten that Jawara started his government as a Christian and even after his reconversion to Islam; he built on the colonial legacy of the so called "secularism" in his conduct of governance and politics. As a result, Sir Dawda allowed the establishment and operation of a wine factory in the Gambia and this became a big controversy that led to the severing of ties between the Gambia and Libya under Muammar Gaddafi.²⁴ This was a major setback for Muslim leaders in their relentless but largely successful struggle to give Islam a

²⁴ It was reported that Jawara had allowed the operation of a beer factory in the Gambia and Gaddafi was against such. This led to a row.

dominant role in the political and development process of the Gambia. Notwithstanding this setback, Islam has continued not only to influence but also to largely direct Gambian diplomacy. When Jawara converted to Islam, and with his government moving towards balancing political and national interest, he established and maintained strong relationships with the Muslim world and Islam, thus, continued to feature prominently in Gambian diplomacy.

While relationships with Libya were broken off, the Gambia maintained strong relationships with other Arab states.²⁵ Sir Dawda's move to brake relationship with Israel, a long term oppressor and opponent of the Palestinian people, in 1973, strengthened Gambia's special relationships with Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirate, Kuwait, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, the Republic of Turkey, Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This gave birth to a special recognition of the Gambia among Arab and other Islamic states and a resulting success of the Gambian diplomacy in the midst of the Islamic ummah.

However, with all these efforts by the Jawara administration to bring the Gambia closer to the Islamic east, some politicians in Banjul were not happy with the Arab response to the country's positive stance towards the Arabs and the Muslim World. During a heated debate in a parliamentary session in 1975, a member of the ruling party, Lamin Bora Mboge, called for the re-establishment of relationship with Israel, arguing that the Arab-Muslim world had failed the Gambia as their support for the country's development programme was substantially below expectation.²⁶ This controversy paid well because Arab aid to the Gambia increased hence-forth and between 1975 and 1980, 27% of international loans and grants to the Gambia were from the Arab states. The Gambia also continued to be a very strong and respected member of the Organization of

²⁵ Omar A. Touray, *The Gambia and the World: A History of the Foreign Policy of Africa's Smallest State, 1965-1995*, Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2000, p. 68.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

Islamic Conference, which was later changed as The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the country became very outspoken on various global issues concerning the Muslim ummah during the conferences organized by the OIC. In 1976, the Gambia was unanimously elected to be a member of the Islamic Solidarity Fund during a conference of Muslim foreign ministers in Turkey. Through the Islamic Solidarity Fund, the Gambia obtained several grants to finance some projects in the Gambia. Key among these projects was the promotion and funding of Islamic education in Bathurst and other Islamic Schools in the Gambia.²⁷

Furthermore, in 1976, president Jawara made certain trips to the Middle East, he performed hajj in the same year and opened a Gambia embassy in Saudi Arabia to cover and look after Gambian interest not only in the Kingdom but throughout the entire Gulf Region and the Middle East as well. The Gambia did also open an embassy in Libya before the severing of ties between the two countries in the mid-seventies. The move to open an embassy in Saudi Arabia facilitated Gambian relations not only with Riyadh but also with the Arabian Gulf states.²⁸ Subsequently in 1978, the Gambia benefitted from a Qatari grant of D3,600,000 to fund radio transmission and the broadcasting of educational programs country-wide. This served as an avenue to promote Islamic education throughout the country. During the Iraq–Iran war in the early 1980s, the Gambia and in particular, its president Sir Dawda Jawara was elected a member of a standing mediation committee of heads of state and government of the Organization of Islamic Conference, OIC, tasked to bring a peaceful end to the war between the two neighboring Muslim countries and members of the Organization.

Additionally, a key and strategic Islamic tie that the Gambia had established during Sir Dawda's time was that with the Islamic

²⁷ The Islamic Solidarity Fund gave Gambia a grant of \$525,000 in 1978 to fund educational projects in the country.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Republic of Mauritania, an Arab country in West Africa with huge Islamic influence over the Gambia. President Jawara himself made reference to this important and strategic relation with Mauritania as he pointed out in his autobiography:

Our relations with Mauritania warmed up with the state visit to Bathurst of President Mouktar Ould Daddah in 1967. I reciprocated the visit a short while later during which I continued to actively pursue the preliminary consultations on a sub-regional economic grouping. We abolished visas between the two countries and Gambian students received scholarships to the Institute of Higher Islamic Studies in Nouakchott. Mauritanian Teachers of Arabic and Islamic studies were sent to teach in Gambian schools.²⁹

The link between the Gambia and Mauritania gave birth to the training of Islamic scholars who played a vital role in the history of the Gambia. Because of the strong relationship between the Gambia and the Arab world, the Gambia always received financial assistance from the richer Arab states and thus, foundations were laid to develop Islam in the Gambia. Money coming from the oil producing countries was used to develop Islamic education and to build schools. One of the best known Islamic schools in the country is the Gambia Muslim High School, which was established in 1975 and since its establishment the School has produced thousands of well-educated Gambian elites, who later became highly successful business men and women, senior government officials, heads of institutions and organizations —both at home and abroad— Islamic leaders, Imams and scholars, who are making huge contributions to promote and protect Islam, its image and the vast heritage of Islamic civilization throughout the Gambia and abroad. The Technical High School in the rapidly growing economically vibrant provincial town of Frafenie in the Northern Region of the Gambia is another iconic Islamic educational institutions sponsored by the Arab friends of the Gambia. There

²⁹ D. K. Jawara, *Kairaba: The Autobiography of Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara*, Haywards Heath, England: Domtom, 2009, p. 225.

are many more of those critical interventions and development supports from the Arab world. Thus, the life span of the First Republic is full of concrete examples illustrating how deeply Islam and its institutions had influenced Gambian diplomacy, politics, economic progress, education and culture during this period. Now it is time to turn our attention to the influence of Islam and its institutions on people's life in the Second Republic of the Gambia, 1994-2016.

Islam in the Second Republic, 1994-2016

It is very clear from the above expose that prior to 1994, Islam played a very important role in the Gambia's national affairs. This was largely due not only to the fact that more than 96 percent of Gambians were Muslims but also that the former president Sir Dawda Jawara, maintained a huge respect for the religion of the majority of his people as he did for that of the minorities as well.

The Gambia formed the Second Republic after the successful bloodless coup that led to the ousting of Sir Dawda Jawara. It brought an end to a 30 years of Jawara's PPP rule and set a new dawn for a new Gambia in the modern time. Under the leadership of former President Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh, the Gambia rapidly grew into a modern Islamic nation state with a higher and stronger commitment from the new leadership to further respect and promote Islam on one hand, and a firm stance against any form of religious extremism on the other.³⁰ President Jammeh built on the existing relationships with the Arab and the Islamic worlds and also he strategically developed further ties with some of those countries in the Maghreb, the Middle and the Far East, the Arabian Gulf and West Africa. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Turkey, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Islamic

³⁰ Marloes Johnson, *Islam, Youth and Modernity in the Gambia*, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 36.

Republic of Mauritania, Nigeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the State of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Libya are an example of the Islamic and Arab nations that the Jammeh administration enjoyed and closed special economic, diplomatic and cultural ties with, during the life span of the Second Republic on the basis of our common Islamic brotherhood. The Second Republic witnessed a sharp increase both in numbers and fields or areas of interest, of the national and international Islamic non-governmental organizations operating in the Gambia. As part of former President Yahya Jammeh's comprehensive and consistent promotional activities to support and protect Islam, its values and institutions in the country, he started by breathing new life into the Gambia Supreme Islamic Council³¹ which is an umbrella institution for all Islamic organizations in the country and therefore, a vital component of the Islamic society in the Gambia.

The Islamic Council, by its own initiatives, assumes the role of a guardian and central Islamic authority and it therefore, provides policy guidelines and operational rules and regulations for all Islamic organizations and all matters of Islamic affairs in the Gambia. Though the Council was established in 1992, it was in the Second Republic that its activities became wider, more effective and far reaching, as the Jammeh administration continued to constantly and extensively use it as an official organ of the government of the day, which advised it on all matters of Islamic affairs. However, the Islamic Council suffers from one major weakness which could tomorrow turn out to be a crippling liability to the organization's wide ranging ambitions and aspirations. In other words; the Council has not been established by an Act of Parliament or any other form of national legislation. It is still a non-governmental organization operating informally as an advisory agency of the government of the Gambia. Notwithstanding this statutory problem of the Gambia Supreme Islamic Council, this

³¹ The Council consists of about 50 Islamic scholars and it aims at promoting Islam and moral standards of the Gambia.

Islamic umbrella organization is effectively contributing its quota to the socio-economic and cultural development of the Gambia, given its relentless efforts to unite Muslims and their institutions under one umbrella and make them speak with one voice and also its successes in numerous conflict prevention and resolution missions it has so far carried out through the country. The Islamic NGOs as well as all the other Islamic support groups, individuals and intervention programs operating in the country have hugely contributed to uplifting the socio-economic and political conditions of Muslim societies as well as individuals across the length and breadth of country. As it has already been alluded to above that as a result of the discriminatory or unfavorable policies of the colonial administration against the majority of the population many Gambian Muslims lagged behind in development immediately after independence. The fact that Muslims initially rejected Western education was also another factor and all these challenges initially delayed the effective or active participation of the Muslims in the political and developmental activities of the new nation state. However, this situation did not last long immediately after independence as the Jawara administration provided very quick and effective remedial programs which resulted in a huge increase in the percentage of indigenous Gambians receiving modern or conventional education in various disciplines and to the higher level and also by putting them in high positions of responsibility in the first government of independent Gambia. The Second Republic, in its turn, introduced a massive reform in the education sector of the Gambia and as a result, the curriculum of the basic education system was comprehensively reviewed and adjusted to meet the competing but equally important demands of their religion and that of modern time education. Islamic schools were reorganized and adjusted and their curricula revised to include subjects equivalent to those of the basic education system of the conventional schools.

Additionally, the government of the Second Republic instituted a unified and integrated curriculum for all educational institutions and levels of learning in the country. As a result, most Gambian madrassas (Islamic schools) now provide in-depth instruction in

a wide range of core subjects of the national conventional schools curricula together with the traditional Islamic Studies curriculum, which include the study of the Holy Quran, Hadith, Tawhid, Islamic History, Arabic, Islamic Family Law, Islamic Transactions, Islamic Law of Rituals or Fiah al-Ibadat, using Arabic as the medium of instruction. Other languages such as English and local languages are also used as media of instruction. The conventional schools subject injected into the Islamic schools curricula and taught in the English medium include but not limited to: History, Geography, Mathematics, English Language and Literature, Life Skills including Conflict Resolution, and Peace-Building and Tolerance, Vocational Education and Training, i.e. Hospitality and Catering, Health and Social Care, Science and Health, Social and Environmental Studies, and Physical Education.³²

These developments meant that the education system in the Gambia under Yahya Jammeh was substantially upgraded to a level where the Islamic schools produced better graduates, who could effectively compete in the job market with their peers graduating from the conventional or Western education system. Many of the Islamic schools' graduates could and in fact did proceed to the University of the Gambia where they graduated with flying colours, while some others are still pursuing their bachelor's degrees in various fields of specialization.

Furthermore, a factor which contributed immensely towards the modernization of Islamic propagation and promotion and the deepening of its influence on society and people's life in the modern time of independent Gambia is the inclusion of Islamic studies as a compulsory subject in the national curricula in the early 1990's. Thus all schools in the Gambia employ Islamic teachers to deliberate on Islamic studies. Schools failing to meet this standard are subjected to immediate and mandatory closure regardless of whether they are Christian, private or public schools.

³² Available at <http://www.unesco.org/ui/litbase/?menu=4&programme=136> accessed 22/06/2015.

Cultural and Educational Relations of the Gambia with the Muslim World in the Second Republic

With regards to the cultural and educational relationships with the Muslim world, president Yahya Jammeh successfully maintained links with almost all the Islamic countries across the globe and as a result, Gambian scholars traveled for their Islamic studies worldwide and returned home to be meaningfully and productively engaged not only in dawa or propagation activities and the building of schools and Islamic institutions, but also in the wider sectors of nation building. Currently, the large network of national and international Islamic NGOs operating in the Gambia to promote and provide easy access to quality and relevant basic, secondary and tertiary education and also providing other basic social and humanitarian services include the following: Africa Muslim Agency of Kuwait, Islamic Relief Agency of Saudi Arabia, Munazamat al-Dawa al-Islamiyyah of Sudan, Islamic Call Society of Libya, Islamic Solidarity Association of West Africa, the Gambia Islamic Union, Birikama Islamic Institutes, Omar Ibn al-Khattab Islamic Institutes, the Gambia Network of Islamic Organizations on Population and Development, the Ummul Qoura Foundation and may many more including a good number of Islamic women empowerment organizations operating in all the regions of the Gambia. In 2010, the government of the Gambia in a pilot project funded by the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah introduced a bilingual education programme in selected Islamic schools using English and Arabic languages as media of instruction. Furthermore, some of the International Islamic NGOs such as Munazamat al-Dawa al-Islamiyyah, Islamic Call Society and Africa Muslims Agency sponsor students from poor families to go to the university of the Gambia and other universities in the sub-region and the Arab world. They also run special programmes to support orphans by providing for their maintenance, education, and medical expenses.

Today, Islam is found at the heart of the Gambian legal system as it is one of the main sources of law within the national

jurisdiction. As discussed above, the Muslims of Banjul, like those of Saint-Louis, in Senegal, demanded for the establishment of a Muslim court in addition to the colonial legal system and jurisdictions, and in 1905 the British government complied. Since then the Islamic court has produced thousands of court cases on matrimonial and property rights, issues or matters concerning conflict resolution and management.³³ The 1997 Constitution of the Gambia provides that in addition to the constitution, the laws of the Gambia include the sharia law as regards matters of marriage, divorce, maintenance, and inheritance among members of communities to which it applies.³⁴ The application of sharia law in these aspects of family life of Muslims is further highlighted by the Sharia Law Recognition Act of the Gambia.³⁵ Under this Act, the above position taken by the constitution is reaffirmed and as a result, Qadi Courts were established in the Greater Banjul area including the Kanifing Qadi Court.

In 2007, the position of Islamic law in The Gambian legal and judicial system was further strengthened by the establishment of the Shariah Court of appeal otherwise, called Qadi Appeal Panels. This Islamic court of higher jurisdiction, has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Qadi Courts of first instance. The Qadi Courts have jurisdiction to apply the Sharia in matters relating to Islamic marriages, divorce, and inheritance in the exercise of their judicial functions, all of the courts, the judges, and the other stakeholders in the judicial system are independent and are subject only to the Constitution, which is the Supreme Law of the land and other laws that apply in the country with regard to matters that do not fall within the ambits of the jurisdiction of Islamic courts.

The influence of Islam in the political life of Muslims in the Gambia is also evidently seen in formal state functions and

³³ David Robinson, "Muslim Societies in West Africa: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives in Digital Form", *Islamic Africa*, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 2014, p. 120.

³⁴ Section 7 (f) 1997 Constitution of the Gambia.

³⁵ Cap 6:05 vol. 2, Laws of the Gambia 1993.

national ceremonies, during which, proceedings are commenced with Muslim prayers, which mostly involved recitations of related ayahs or verses from the holy Quran, then followed by the Christian prayers. Similarly, all Muslim holidays are observed as national holidays to meet the demands of the majority Muslim population. Today all madrasas in the Gambia are formalized and the education policy of the government of the Second Republic provided for adequate facilities to encourage Islamic education. The Jammeh administration through the Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education created a special supervisory agency for Islamic and Arabic education in the Gambia. The agency, called, 'The General Secretariat for Islamic and Arabic Education in the Gambia, [The Amanah], regulates, supervises and coordinates all Arabic and Islamic basic and secondary education institutions in the country. The Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education working closely with Amanah or the General Secretariat, had contributed immensely to boosting enrollments and enhanced access to basic and secondary education particularly for Muslim girls. This intervention by the ministry has broken the misconception that Muslim girls should not go to conventional schools as the Secretariat is not only advocating for girls education, but is actually making provision for them within their educational system.³⁶ As for the Arabic and Islamic tertiary education institutions, they are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology and therefore regulated and supervised by the National Accreditation and Quality Assurance Authority [NAQAA], which is an agency of the ministry. Three Islamic universities were established in the Gambia during former president Yahya Jammeh's time and all of them were treated with the same respect and recognition as the University of the Gambia, which is the country's only national university. The universities namely President Yahya Jammeh Islamic University [now Al-

³⁶ Zero Draft - National Report-Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action (2014) June 2014.

Ehsan University], Al-Hikmah University and the Islamic Online University [now International Online University] benefited from and enjoyed huge political, moral and material support from the former president and his government and in fact some of them received substantial financial assistance as personal donations from president Jammeh himself.

Quranic Memorization Revolution in the Gambia and the Second Republic

The arrival of president Yahya Jammeh in power in 1994 and his subsequent institution of the Second Republic in 1997 coincided with the advent of what we would call "The Era of Quranic Memorization Revolution in the Gambia". During the 22 years of Jammeh's rule a large number of Quranic teaching and memorization centers were established in all over the Gambia including most noticeably in the capital Banjul and the Greater Banjul area. In fact, one of the best known and the most successful of these tahfeez centers is situated just within a throwing stone from the Presidential Palace in Banjul, where president Jammeh resided throughout the 22 years of his presidency. These tahfeez centers successfully produce so many young children, both males and females, who have memorized the whole Quran, with some of them between the ages of 9 and 12 years old. In the past, tahfeez centers in the Gambia were very limited in number and the country was not a popular destination for the vast majority of those who would set out to memorize the entire Holy Quran. Instead, parents used to send their children to deferent tahfeez centers in Senegal and Mauritania. In contrast, today thousands of Gambian Muslim children, joined by their peers from Senegal and Guinea Bissau, are privileged to have and attend better organized and in some cases fully sponsored Quranic memorization centers in their own backyards. President Yahya Jammeh provided huge support, in cash and kind, to deferent tahfeez schools across the length and breadth of the country. He used to organize Quranic competitions, both locally and internationally and in all the competitions valuable prizes including exorbitant sums of money

for would be winners were attached. The period between 2010 and 2016, witnessed several competitions in which the winners would go home with one million Gambian Dalasis each [about 35,000 American Dollars during the period]. This was a remarkable period in the overall history of Islamic propagation, the presence of Islam itself and its influence on the socio-economic and political life of people in both colonized and independent Gambia. It was the first time ever in the history of Islam in the Gambia that a student of a Quranic school, locally known as talibe, was awarded generously.

In 2016, in collaboration with IRCICA, a major international Quranic competition in Banjul was organized and attended by contestants and senior experts as judges from across the Islamic world. This competition was won by a Gambian hafeez, who graduated from one of the tahfeez centers of the Quranic Memorization Revolution Era, referred to above. The proceedings of this competition were shown live on the national television every day. There were also special Quranic competitions for female reciters as a way of encouraging them and the youths in general to give their time to the Holy Quran and try memorize it or at least as much of as possible. Over all, promotion of teaching, proper recitation and memorization of the Holy Quran was of the major areas in serving the cause of Islam in the Gambia.

The influence of Islam in the political life and history of the Gambia reached highest levels in recent years. The first action that president Jammeh took to promote Islam was to build a mosque at the State House ground in Banjul, which is the Official Residence of the President of the Gambia and he later mosques were built in all government offices across the length and breadth of the country. President Jammeh created a religious affairs portfolio and first placed it under the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, he later transferred the new portfolio to the Ministry of the Interior and finally to the Office of the President. In August, 2016, the Religious Affairs department was upgraded into a full ministry, named Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowments. A ministry of religious affairs in a country where the Muslims constitute more than 97 percent of the population is in actual fact

a ministry of Islamic affairs. Similarly, in 2013, the working hours was extended from 8am-4pm to 8am-6pm and Friday was declared a non-working day through the Gambia so that Muslims would have more time to better prepare for the Friday Prayers and other spiritual activities. In addition to reorganizing the hajj programme in the Gambia, Jammeh created a new National Hajj Commission and placed the Commission and the entire hajj operations under his direct supervision. It must be said that the level and extent of promotion of and support for Islam and Muslims in the Gambia in this period has been unprecedented in the political history of Gambia. This period literally and practically ended the long standing discrimination between Muslims educated in the Arab world, who focused mainly on Islamic studies and the Arabic language, and Muslims educated in the Western way and the Western world. The former were to a large extent not part of government in the past, rather, Islamic scholars were confined within the propagation field; they mainly worked as Imams, preachers, Islamic teachers and a few of them became qadis. However, the Islamic scholars themselves could be partly blamed in that many of them did know or could not speak the English language which is the language of business for the government of The Gambia until today and this shortcoming on their part was used to justify and continue the discrimination referred to above. This situation was completely changed by the Jammeh administration where Islamic scholars and young Muslims who studied in the Islamic East were the same opportunity enjoyed by all other Gambians and therefore placed in various high positions of responsibility in the government. They served as ministers, permanent secretaries, directors, managers, ambassadors, provincial governors and heads of departments as well as senior academics and heads of tertiary institutions. To conclude, president Jammeh's unprecedented push for the promotion of Islam in the Gambia reached its peak in 2016, when he declared the Gambia an Islamic Republic in a huge political rally in Brufut Town, Kombo South District of the West Coast Region of the country. Although the Brufut Declaration was just a mere declaration of intent to be implemented later, but it is still a huge

credit for the former president Yahya Jammeh and his government and the Second Republic as a whole.

Conclusion

The Gambia has always been an Islamic territory long before the arrival of the Europeans. The foundation of Bathurst (modern day Banjul) and its subsequent establishment as the colonial capital of the Gambia was not linked with the advent of Islam in the region. In fact, the capital was at some point in history occupied by a large number of Europeans and other Christian inhabitants. However, it must be noted at this juncture that the Islamic history and civilization came and prospered in Africa for several centuries before the arrival of Christianity in the continent and by the time the ancient city of Timbuktu was founded in the 12th century, A.D., Islam and its civilization had already been firmly anchored in the sub-region. Similarly, by the time Bathurst was founded in the 18th century, Islamic civilization had existed and prospered in the region for centuries and that Muslims were all over the surrounding territories. Thus, the moment Bathurst was founded, Muslims moved in to the new colonial capital and their number continued to increase substantially and their say in the day to day activities of the tiny island became more and more pronounced. So, the Muslim domination and influence in the new city continued unabated, they established organizations and political parties which participated in the colonial politics, commercial and development activities and consequently, they influenced policy making in Bathurst. Because the number of Muslims was larger than other groups, it became easy for the Muslims to influence policy making in the colonial capital. This trend of domination and political influence for Islam and the Muslims of Bathurst continued to grow from one level to another.

From the level of one representative in the Colonial Legislative Council and to the establishment of an Islamic Court in the Capital, they rose to political prominence, to the establishment of political parties and produced very prominent and influential

personalities like I.M. Garba Jahumpa and Sir Dawda Jawara, who would soon become the first and founding president of the newly Independent Gambia in 1965. In all this development, Islam was used as the driving force to propagate for support and to meet political ends. As mentioned above, Sir Dawda became the first president of the republic and he continued to use Islam to gain influence and support of the majority of Gambians, who embraced and followed his political ideologies until 1994, when his three decades of political domination was abruptly brought to an end by the military. The trend of political domination and influence by Islam and Muslims in the Gambia became greater and much stronger in the Second Republic under the charismatic leadership of former president Yahya Jammeh. On the other hand, Islam being a double-edged sword and a human friendly as well as a universal way of life, did make the best use of and hugely benefited from its being used for political gain by the politicians throughout the past three generations of the political history of the Gambia [from 1800 to independence time, the First Republic time and that of the Second Republic] to gain stronger and deeper ground in every aspect of life in the Gambia. Islam, its laws and moral and ethical values are profoundly anchored in the beliefs and cultures and evidently manifested in the daily life and routine activities of the people. The Islamic rules of engagement in commercial transactions, marriages, all other matters of family life in general and even in the banking system to a certain extent, are observed or followed. Similarly, the Arabic language, in general and Islamic terminologies in particular, have greatly influenced the local languages and, their respective dialects, of the people including those of the non-Muslim communities. Today Islamic influence and signs of Muslim domination are found, felt and seen in almost every part of the country and Gambians' way of life including the laws continue to reflect Islamic values. The capital Banjul, the provincial capitals, major commercial and trading centers and all other main cities and towns as well as villages throughout the Gambia are all still under great Islamic influence and absolute Muslim control.

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Southern Africa's Muslim Minorities: Scholarly Research and Bibliographical Reflections

Muhammed Haron*

ABSTRACT

Africa is a lively and vibrant continent. It is not just a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-lingual continent, but it is also a multi-religious one. Africa had been an abode of Islam for many centuries. Considering the width and breadth of this vast continent, the role Islam and Muslims played had differed from one region to the other. While Muslims formed a majority in some parts, in other regions they formed a minority and the Muslims who settled in Southern Africa fall into the second category. In this regard, this article underscores the magnitude of reference texts such bibliographies that serve the needs of researchers, academics and other stakeholders focusing on Southern Africa's Muslim communities. The study intends to cogently illustrate to what extent these scholarly outputs—regionally and internationally— contributed towards the appreciation of an emerging Muslim Civilization in the Southern African region; and it does so by placing the argument within a knowledge production-based theoretical frame.

* Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Botswana and Associate Researcher at the University of Pretoria.

Introduction

Over the past years, studies on Africa's Muslim communities in the sub-Saharan region and more specifically those located in the Southern African region have gradually grown —demographically speaking— into a sizeable number according to the Pew surveys¹ that have been further supported by the studies conducted by Kaba and Kettani.² As a result of these outputs, one witnessed the appearance of book length publications that were complemented by popular articles that devoted special issues tangibly capturing "Islam in Africa" and these were further supplemented by a series of articles that appeared in a variety of national and international peer-reviewed journals as reflected in Paul Schrijver's 2006 publication as well as in the updates on the AfricaBib.org site complemented by Cambridge University's *Index Islamicus* and Edinburg University's *African Bibliography*.

From a purely academic perspective, this is indeed a positive development; one that has the potential to intensify further if more (indigenous) researchers are thoroughly trained and brought on board to explore and investigate topics and themes that have been under-researched or that necessitate greater attention. These outputs clearly add value to the production of knowledge industry and add significance to the academics' knowledge in gaining greater insight into the lives of the Muslim communities across the African continent (either as religious majorities or minorities).

¹ Pew Center of Religion and Public Life, *The Future of the Global Muslim Population*, Washington, Pew Forum, 2011, and Pew Center of Religion and Public Life, *Mapping the Muslim Global Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population*, Washington, Pew Forum, 2009.

² A.J. Kaba, "The Numerical Distribution of Muslims in Africa", *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 26, issue No.3 2009, pp.1-23, Summer. Houssain, Kettani, "2010 World Muslim Population", *Proceedings of the 8th Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities*, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 2010. M. Haron. "Southern Africa's Muslims: Making sense of the census", *BOLESWA: Journal of Theology, Religion and Philosophy*, vol. 4, issue no.1, December 2012, pp.17-29.

Bibliographies³, as significant containers of knowledge, point, on the one hand, to the gaps that still exists in certain fields such as the Muslim media and, on the other, they direct one to certain controversial themes such as terrorism that have been and that are still highly debatable and contentious.⁴

Bearing these points in mind, the purpose of this article is not to give any detailed insight into the social history of the Muslim communities in Southern Africa. Its basic objective is to only offer a superficial sketch so that one is able to zoom in on the scholarly outputs over the past fifty years (circa 1965 - 2015). Put differently, it wants to reflect more specifically on the scholarly outputs that capture and reflect the contributions of these communities over the mentioned period. Since these outputs are contained and catalogued in Schrijver's 2006 bibliography as well as his online work-in-progress (that is, the AfricaBib.org site), the article draws upon these to provide —not necessarily adequately— an overview and understanding of areas that have been sufficiently researched, and it points to a set of themes/topics that researchers have sorely neglected to explore and investigate.

Southern Africa's Muslims: A Bird's Eye-View

Africa is not one country as some myopically-minded journalists and bloggers may fancy describing it; it is a pulsating, lively and vibrant continent. It is a continent that has been endowed with plenty of resources that may serve the needs of its diverse cultural communities. Africa is not just a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and

³ J.D. Pearson, *World Bibliography of African Bibliographies*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1975. J. Macllwaine, "The Three Ages of African Studies Reference Works", *Africa Bibliography*, November 2007, pp. vii-xviii. S. Kimlicka, "Bibliographic Database as a Support Tool for Knowledge Management", H. Zimmermann et al (Eds.), *Knowledge Management and Communication System. Workflow Management, Multimedia Knowledge Transfer*, Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium for Information Science, Prague, Konstanz – UVK Verlags Gesellschaft, 1998.

⁴ A. Silke (Ed.), *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, London, Frank Cass, 2004.

multi-lingual continent, but it is also a multi-religious one. Since time immemorial, it has been the abode of an array of local and regional African traditional religions and for many centuries it is also the domicile of the Abrahamic religious traditions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Hence, John Mbiti's description⁵ that it is a notoriously religious continent. According to Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar,⁶ the continent has, of late, become the home of (other) immigrant (Asian) religious traditions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, and the Bahai Faith, and thus making it very conscious of its religious identity as compared to Europe that desires to remain secular despite the presence of various religious traditions across that continent.

As these religious groups settled in different parts of the continent to pursue their economic goals through trade and employment as civil servants and in other capacities, they inadvertently laid the foundations for the growth of their religious traditions. This was generally the case with those Muslim communities that settled in Southern Africa's urban and rural areas since the late 19th and the early 20th centuries; when one glances at the land-locked countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, one notes that these Muslim communities' forebears laid the fundamentals by using their homes as temporary sacred spaces for their daily/weekly ritual prayers. The same may be said for those Muslim communities that reside in countries such as Mozambique and South Africa where they have had much longer social histories; in the case of South Africa the Muslim community is over three centuries old and makes up about 2% of the total population, and in the case of Mozambique the Muslim community that makes up about 20% of the population has been in that country for a much longer period because of their close connections with East Africa's Muslims; communities that have been around for many centuries

⁵ J. Mbiti *African Religions and Philosophy*, London, Heinemann, 1969.

⁶ S. Ellis and G. ter Haar, "Africa's Religious Resurgence and the Politics of Good and Evil", *Current History*, April 2008, pp. 180-185.

as recorded by Trimingham⁷ and others (see Table 1).

On the whole, these communities formed clusters of minorities within predominantly Christian environments where, despite the numerous socio-political, economic and religious challenges over many decades and centuries, they remained resilient and endured all sorts of hardships. They responded to these challenges by searching through inventive and creative ways in reaffirming their identities and entrenching themselves onto the Southern African soil. One of the important tasks that they undertook after having opening their modest homes as sacred locales was the setting up of permanent religious structures such as mosques and madrasas (i.e. Muslim [afternoon] schools). They managed to build these institutions as they grew numerically and as they became economically mobile.

These institutions, as noted in most of the major cities (such as Cape Town, Gaborone, Harare, and Lusaka) in Southern Africa, have become critical historical landmarks not only for them as Muslim communities but also for those societies among whom they settled and with whom they socialized. If one goes to Cape Town's Bo-Kaap – also popularly known as the Malay Quarters – the Awwal mosque along with other institutions have become tourist destinations, and anyone passing through Gaborone will find that the first mosque is conveniently located opposite the University of Botswana and in the vicinity of the National Stadium. Many of these structures were built by skilled Muslim builders who contributed —along with other Muslims who established small trading stations to participate in the business sector— toward the local economies. Through their different efforts and miscellaneous developments, they tangibly transformed their circumstances to such a degree that they have become fairly conspicuous as a minority in spite of being numerically weak.

⁷ J. Trimingham, *The Influence of Islam upon Africa*, London, Praeger, 1968.

COUNTRY	POPULATION	Muslims	Muslim %	APGR %
Angola	18,991,889	100,657	0.53%	2,672
Botswana	1,978,091	8,308	0.42%	1.452
Congo	67,827,495	1,010,630	1.49%	2.927
Lesotho	2,084,963	4,378	0.21%	0.873
Malawi	15,687,893	2,009,619	12.81%	2.781
Madagascar	20,146,442	143,040	0.71%	2.807
Mauritius	1,296,569	215,879	16.65%	0.821
Mozambique	23,427,044	4,134,873	17.65%	2.327
Namibia	2,212,931	22,129	1.00%	1.925
Seychelles	86,202	586	0.68%	0.608
South Africa	50,601,898	738,788	1.46%	0.982
Swaziland	1,200,731	2,401	0.20%	1.333
Tanzania	45,039,573	13,565,919	30.60%	2.812
Zambia	13,250,215	132,502	1.00%	2.434
Zimbabwe	12,556,470	125,565	1.00%	0.269

Table 1: Southern Africa’s Muslims: Kettani’s 2010 Estimates⁸

Although it is not the main interest of this article to reflect upon the emergence, development and transformation of (all or some of) these Muslim communities who have become an integral part to the Southern African region, its focus is principally on the scholarly outputs that capture their presence and contributions. These communities, it has been established by many researchers, form part of the larger societies that live in—and are citizens of—countries that are member states of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) such as South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi. Taking into account the different factors (e.g. geography, history, sociology, demography) that have been and that are at play, it zooms in on the works of scholars that looked at those Muslim communities who reside in some of the mentioned nation-states; in each instance, when tracing their respective social histories,

⁸ Houssain Kettani, “2010 World Muslim Population”, *Proceedings of the 8th Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 2010*.

one will observe that though their social histories differ markedly from one another there too were similarities.

These may be attributed to their varied and distinctive socio-political, economic and religious circumstances that have helped to shape their identities and that have assisted to transform their status within Southern Africa's nation-states. Various papers that have been presented at regional and international conferences and that have been published in non-accredited and accredited journals over the past two decades, demonstrated the wide-ranging approaches and the different issues that researchers have tackled. However, before this essay gets immersed into reflecting upon some of these research outputs, it is necessary to turn to the process of knowledge production that operates as an applicable theoretical frame for its overall objectives.

African Institutions: Driving the (Islam in Africa) Knowledge Production Process

Over the past two decades (circa 1995-2015) Africa's higher education sector witnessed more major developments; among the significant shifts that have or are taking place was the move from being purely teaching based institutions to either becoming research oriented institutions or in bringing about a combination of the two. Whilst a few of these institutions succeeded in this venture and moved up the research rankings, others failed dismally for a number of reasons. For African institutions there have indeed been and there still are numerous crucial challenges since each of them depended and continues to depend on various factors; they, *inter alia*, rely heavily upon (a) government funding to make the necessary internal and external changes, (b) infrastructure to contribute to this vital adjustment in an ever changing educational environment, and (c) trained personnel to initiate and sustain this decisive transformation.

Though African institutions have been aware of these in order for them to bring about this critical makeover, they generally expected all stakeholders to play a part in it; however, these universities specifically relied and continue to lean on the role

of their academic staff whose indispensable inputs and essential outputs assist in the 'knowledge production' process. Africa's academic researchers are indeed the primary generators and key performers who are expected to drive and deliver the research process from the start to the end; by doing so they would have effectively and meaningfully contributed towards "the knowledge production process". According to Cloete & Bunting,⁹ "the flagship universities have a crucial role as producers of appropriately skilled professionals, research skills, academic staff for other institutions and as nodes for knowledge networks". Whilst this is the case, they also noted that, "African universities are not strengthening self-generative capacity, nor making a substantial contribution to new knowledge production".

Cloete & Bunting's argument was based upon the fact that their governments often perceive national universities as being there to educate the next generation of state or civil functionaries ([by] mainly [adopting a] teaching model). If this is indeed so and as observed in quite a few African countries despite the globalization of education, then the questions which come to mind are: In which way should they convince their respective governments to assist in transforming them from traditional teaching institutions to proactive research ones? What steps should they take in order to strengthen their internal and external capacities that would assist both public and private sectors? How can they really effectively change the scenario in order to successfully generate relevant knowledge? At what point should they approach the private companies to invest in their infrastructure and resources that would benefit all and sundry? And with regards to the focus of this essay, would social scientists consider the study of "Islam in Africa" or - worded slightly differently - the examination of "Muslim communities in Africa" be a significant research project that would be of interest to both the government and the private industry?

⁹ N. Cloete & I. Bunting, *Strengthening Knowledge Production in Universities; Five South African Case Studies*, Pretoria, OECD, 2013.

Since it is not this article's purpose to respond to all of these and other related questions because of constraints of space, its main concern is with the question that was raised at the end of the previous paragraph; and that is whether Islam in Africa research should be given the necessary scholarly attention and whether it should be placed on the primary list of social scientists? Of late, this has indeed become a major area of concern for western-based Think Tanks.¹⁰ Whilst some demonstrated an interest in these African Muslim communities' traditional histories, most of them directed their concentration on the contemporary issue of Muslim fundamentalism; a phenomenon that has, since the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, been on the rise and that has, over the past four decades, given way to extremism and terrorism in some areas of the Middle East; phenomena that have (opportunistically) spilt over into the African continent. This having been the case, a slight detour will be in order to show the necessity for research to prove or disprove the rise of these activities but that also point to the importance and relevance of knowledge production and its management.

Knowledge Production and South Africa's Muslims

There is a need among social scientists to cooperate so that they may generate the "knowledge production" process model that reflects an interdisciplinary approach; one that would benefit various stakeholders such as SADC governments, the private sector, and civil societies. Perhaps one simple example can be extracted to illustrate the positive outcomes of interdisciplinary research. Here one turns the attention to South Africa's Western Cape region and more specifically to the Greater Cape Town area that has been examined by a range of social scientists (such as historians, linguists, geographers, sociologists, and political scientists); many of whom hailed from South Africa and from European countries

¹⁰ L. Hudson, "The New Ivory Towers: Think Tanks, Strategic Studies and Counter-realism", *Middle East*, vol. XII, issue no. 4, Winter 2005.

such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Norway.

When one scans the field of "Islam –or rather Muslims– at the Cape", one observes that a number of European scholars have made their scholarly inputs; from among the long list –whose works have been catalogued in Schrijver and Haron's respective bibliographies– are Eric Germain –the French academic, Sindre Bangstad– the Norwegian researcher, Inga Niehaus –the German scholar, and Anna Sims– the Russian researcher. Each of them conducted lengthy research projects and produced (invaluable) research findings that were published in articles and in book length texts. Despite some of the conspicuous shortcomings, their research brought fresh data and information on the Cape Muslim community to the fore. As a consequence of their academic interventions, they have generated knowledge that richly complemented the work of South African scholars such as the late Achmat Davids (a self-made social historian) and the late Robert Shell (the UWC slave historian) as well as seasoned researchers such as Shamil Jeppie (a UCT historian), Gabeba Baderoon (a UCT graduate in literature), and Abdulkader Tayob (a UCT religious studies professor). When one studies the methods that these European researchers adopted and evaluate their findings, then one is able to see how, why, and where they have differed from their South African counterparts. These scholarly outputs essentially did two things when they published their research findings: (a) they opened up the debates regarding under-researched aspects of the Cape Muslim community, and (b) they demonstrated to what extent the community underwent radical social transformation during the latter part of the twentieth century that they all addressed.

Whilst this example was used to illustrate the nature of the outcomes of research whether they are pursued individually or collectively, it underlined that research or rather knowledge production is a key process that contributes substantially towards a user-friendly bibliography that acts, in turn, as crucial source of reference. What this knowledge production process highlighted was that individuals from different disciplines explored aspects that brought to the on board diverse understandings of the Cape

Muslim community. Since this was a successful academic venture, one is certain that if similar studies are undertaken to examine other urbanized Muslim communities across the Southern Africa region then these would indeed yield meaningful results; they would do so for both the region's governments in terms of planning and accommodating Muslim minorities, and for the private sector that serve the minority Muslim market and that also trade with Muslim states that desire *Shari'ah* compliant also known as *Halal* (i.e. permissible/wholesome) products for their markets.

Studies such as these are usually invaluable to government departments in SADC countries that need data and information on these communities' social development, political activism, economic mobility, cultural changes, and religious transformation. Essentially, individual or collaborative academic interventions locally, nationally, or regionally will definitely contribute to an insightful understanding of the evolving urbanized Muslim community whether they reside in Harare or Lusaka or Gaborone. And for one to get an overview and insight, one has to turn to bibliographies that capture and catalogue academic and non-academic interventions.

Academic (and Non-Academic) Interventions: Regional Coverage

Indeed, it is the Muslim communities' developments and transformations that mainly caught the researchers' eyes; these individuals as social scientists have undertaken the difficult task of making some sort of academic intervention in order to place some of the Southern Africa's Muslims on the academic radar screens. When returning to earlier bibliographies such as those of Patrick Ofori and Samir Zoghby that devoted themselves to "Islam in Africa,"¹¹ it was obvious that not much material was listed on Southern Africa's Muslim communities when they published

¹¹ P. Ofori, *Islam in Africa South of the Sahara: A Select Bibliographic Guide*, Nendeln, KTO Press, 1977. S. Zoghby, *Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: Partially Annotated Guide*, Washington, Library of Congress, 1978.

their texts, which covered research (circa 1900-1980) from the early twentieth century up until the time of their publication. At that time (that is, the late 1970s), research projects on Southern African Muslims were largely absent and those that appeared over the years such as Hans Kahler and Adrianus van Selms' works were among the handful of publications that were circulated; Kahler and van Selms, it may be argued, were pioneers in this regard since both placed the Cape Muslim community on the academic map and particularly when they wrote on the unique Cape Arabic-Afrikaans literature.

Nonetheless, the general absence of research essays or papers on Southern Africa's Muslims in particular may be attributed to a few inter-related factors. Among these are: (a) Southern African universities have not as yet been established, and those that were present had essentially been set up to focus on teaching rather than research; (b) the absence of regionally/nationally trained researchers such as historians, anthropologists, sociologists, ethnographers, demographers and a host of others, (c) the nonexistence of Muslim populations in countries such as Namibia, Swaziland, and Lesotho did not merit any research interest whatsoever; (d) scholars who showed an interest in the continent's affairs confined themselves to more exciting or important regions such as West and East African where Muslims were numerically strong, economically dominant, and politically influential, and (e) research funds were basically unavailable from both governmental and private institutions in Southern African; these institutions gave their attention to what they considered as primary issues; the region's Muslim communities were by and large impotent politically and economically, and as a consequence social scientists did not see the need to give any research consideration to either the emerging or established communities.

Scholarly Interventions and "Islam in Southern Africa"

Be that as it may, during the past two and a half decades (circa 1990-2016), a few scholars ventured to offer their scholarly insights as regards the status of Muslims in Southern Africa by

reflecting on "Islam in Southern Africa". One of first individuals to draw attention to Islam in Southern Africa was Gorkeh Gamal Nkrumah.¹² He assessed the state of Islam or rather Muslims in this region for the *Review of African Political Economy* during 1991. Nkrumah's article, however, focused mainly on South Africa with intermittent references to Malawi and Zimbabwe where he witnessed "Islamic revivalism". On the whole, Nkrumah's one-sided treatment did not assist in giving a good understanding of Muslims regionally and for this he was heavily critiqued by Farid Esack in a rejoinder. It was, however, the University of Zimbabwe scholar, namely Ephraim Mandivenga¹³ who tried to offer an acceptable regional overview. In spite of Mandivenga's academic intervention, his "The Role of Islam in Southern Africa" —though it laid some foundation— was not a satisfactory outline and nor was it recorded in Schrijver's compilation. A similar argument may be directed at the former University of Cape Town-based scholar, Ebrahim Moosa who is currently attached to the University of Notre Dame. Moosa's 1993 journal article titled "Discursive Voices of Diaspora Islam in Southern Africa" did not at all reach out in discussing the region's Muslim communities; though this was partially done in the introductory section much of the article focused on South Africa's Muslims. One can argue along similar lines when assessing Dominic Gonzalez (1994) "Islam y politica en Africa Meridional".¹⁴

Two other South African scholars, moreover, made spirited attempts to give a more detailed treatment regionally. The first was the University of Cape Town's Abdulkader Tayob; the latter's book chapter was simply titled "Southern Africa".¹⁵ He was

¹² G.G. Nkrumah, "Islam in Southern Africa", *Review of African Political Economy*, vol.18, issue52, 1991, pp. 94-97.

¹³ E. Mandivenga, "Islam in Southern Africa.", C. Hallencreutz & M. Palmberg (Eds.), *Religion and Politics in Southern Africa*, Uppsala: SIAS, 1991.

¹⁴ D. Gonzalez, "Islam y politica en Africa Meridional", *Revista de Africa y Medio Oriente*, vol.11, issue 1, 1994, pp.175-190.

¹⁵ Abdulkader Tayob "Southern Africa.", D. Westerlund & Inga Svanberg (Eds.),

followed by the University of the Western Cape's Robert Shell (passed away in 2016) who wrote a book chapter on "Islam in Southern Africa".¹⁶ Whilst these may be regarded as significant scholarly interventions from a regional perspective, their contributions were complemented by two other essays; the one was by Abdurahman Doi whose article "Proselytism and Islam in Southern Africa" appeared in 2000¹⁷, and the other was by Mohamed Amra who presented his ideas as a conference paper in 2001. While the former was a Rand Afrikaans University-based South Asian academic, the latter was a Durban-based Muslim activist. Amra, who worked and is still associated with the Riyadh-based World Assembly of Muslim Youth, delivered a summary of his *Arrival of Islam in Southern Africa* publication at the Ali Mazrui 2001 International Conference on "Islam in Africa"; one that took place at the University of Binghamton. Subsequently Amra updated and represented it at the Kampala conference "Islamic Civilization in Eastern Africa". This 54 page text was published in 2006 and by then he also included a part of it under an altered title "Islam in Southern Africa: A Historical Survey" in IRCICA's conference proceedings.¹⁸ Compared to the earlier mentioned university based scholars, despite the absence of a theoretical frame for his investigations Amra covered the ten SADC countries in much more detail.

About four years after Amra's publication Abdur Rahman Madidi, who comes from Zimbabwe, penned 62 page self-published text titled *The Spread of Islam in Southern Africa and its*

Islam Outside the Arab World, London, Curzon, Ch. 5, 1999, pp. 111-124.

¹⁶ R. Shell, "Islam in Southern Africa", Nehemia Levtzion & Randall L. Pouwels (Eds.), *The History of Islam in Africa*, Cape Town, David Philips and London, James Currey, 2000, pp. 327-348.

¹⁷ A. Doi. "Proselytism and Islam in Southern Africa," *Emory International Law Journal*, vol.14, issue 2, Summer 2000, pp. 1147-1190.

¹⁸ A. Muhammad, "Islam in Southern Africa: A Historical Survey", Abdu Kasozi & Sadik Unay (Eds.), *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Islamic Civilization in Eastern Africa*, Istanbul, IRCICA, 2006. Ch.6, pp. 99-118.

Impact on Society: A Geographical Perspective during 2010. Unlike Amra's approach that dealt with each country separately, Madidi discussed, among others, Africa's early Muslim pioneers and its Muslim populations, before he discoursed about South Africa's Muslim organizations and institutions; thereafter he reflected upon contemporary African conversions to Islam prior to offering a retrospective view. Despite its particular method, the booklet failed to give deep insights into the Muslims across the region. Here mention should be made of Viera Pawliková-Vilhanová's important reflections on the region as regards Islam's spread and representation. Pawliková-Vilhanová, who is a senior research scholar at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and attached to the University of St. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, addressed the 'Rethinking of the Spread of Islam in Eastern and Southern Africa.'

This particular article appeared in the *Asian and African Studies Journal*, and an amended and updated version of it was published in the 2006 issue of the *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*.¹⁹ The latter was, in fact, presented at IRCICA and Awqaf SA's joint 2006 conference on "Islamic Civilization in Southern Africa". In any case, Pawliková-Vilhanová's presentation was indeed far more detailed and engaging when compared to those texts that also examined the arrival and spread of Muslims in the region. It thus implied that she unlike Tayob or Shell or Amra made attempts to weave into her essay contemporary developments. Related to these, Haron published two papers in 2012 and 2014 respectively that attempted to address contemporary issues regionally; the first was a journal article titled "Southern Africa's Muslims: Making sense of the census" that assessed the region's Muslim demographics, and the second was a conference paper that assessed Southern Africa's Muslims: Emergence, Development, and Transformation. In addition to these, he completed one

¹⁹ V. Pawlikova-Vilhanova, "Rethinking the Spread of Islam in Eastern and Southern Africa", *Asian and African Studies*, vol.19, issue 1, 2010, pp. 134-167.

essay that appeared in a Turkish conference proceedings, a chapter that appeared in a Springer handbook²⁰, and another for a Palgrave handbook that will appear in 2019. Whilst the latter addressed contemporary developments and transformations in the educational, political, and social arenas, the former focused specifically on their demographic spread regionally and in each of SADC's member states.

Scholarly Shortcomings and Their "Islam in Africa" Texts

Generally, one finds that the articles and chapters have not satisfactorily and evenly covered contemporary developments among the region's Muslim communities; this argument persists when scanning selected texts that have ambitiously treated "Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa" or "Religion in Africa" (see a substantial list in Schrijver's 2006 publication). In the same vein, the books²¹ by John S. Trimingham (1968), Mervyn Hiskett (1994), and Timothy Insoll (2003) suffered a similar fate; none of them included a reasonable discussion on Southern Africa's Muslims. Roman Lomeier (2013), who belong to this group of scholars, is the only one that made an attempt when he mapped a portion of Southern Africa's Muslims' social history by devoting a chapter to South Africa's "Cape Muslims" and by mentioning in passing Mozambique's Muslim community whose social history

²⁰ "Southern Africa's Experience of Muslim Da'wah (circa 1860s-2010s): Muslim Activism, Religious Transformation", Ahmet Kavas et al (Eds.), *Islam in Africa: Past, Present, and The Future Conference Proceedings*, Istanbul, The Foundation for Research in Islamic Sciences and Istanbul Medeniyet University, 2017. pp.587-624; "Experience of Muslims in Southern Africa.", M. Woodward & R. Lukens-Bull (Eds), *Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives*, Springer, Cham. 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73653-2_80-1. T. Insoll, *The Archeology of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Cambridge, CUP, 2003. M. Hiskett, *The Course of Islam in Africa*, Edinburgh, EUP, 1994. J. Trimingham, *The Influence of Islam upon Africa*, London, Praeger, 1968.

²¹ T. Insoll, *The Archeology of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Cambridge, CUP, 2003; M. Hiskett, *The Course of Islam in Africa*, Edinburgh, EUP, 1994; and J. Trimingham, *The Influence of Islam upon Africa*, London, Praeger, 1968.

was inextricably tied up with East Africa Muslims.²²

Alongside these books, Charles C. Stewart (1986), Ali Mazrui (1995) and Nehemia Levtzion's (1997) encyclopedia entries as well as Sulayman Nyang's (1984), Ira Lapidus' (2002) and Muhammed Haron's (2010) chapters,²³ for example, endured a similar outcome; each of them illustrated how problematic it was to present reasonable overviews and good enough insights. Though Mario Azevedo (1998) offered a cursory view of Islam's expansion,²⁴ he too did not say much about the miniscule numbers of Muslims in Southern Africa; only Mozambique was mentioned *en passant*. Elias Bongmba (2006) who looked more at the scholarly contributions only referred to the research produced by South African scholars, namely Abdulkader Tayob and Ebrahim Moosa,²⁵ and Bongmba like others failed to refer to the respective booklets of Ephraim Mandivenga (1982) on Zimbabwe and James Amanze (1999) on Botswana, and nor was he aware of Amra's publication.²⁶ One may

²² R. Lomeier, *Muslim Societies in Africa*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2013.

²³ I. Lapidus, "Islam in 20th century Africa", *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge, CUP, 2002. Ch. 30 & 31: 732-784. N. Levtzion, "Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa", M. Eliade (Ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, New York, MacMillan Publishing Co., vol. 7-8, 1997, pp.344-357. N. Levtzion & R.L. Pouwels (Eds.), *The History of Islam in Africa*, Cape Town, David Philips and London, James Currey, 2000. A. Mazrui, "Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa", John Esposito (Ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, New York, OUP, 1995, Vol.2, pp.261-271; S. Nyang, *Islam, Christianity, and African Identity*, Washington, Amana, 1984; C. Stewart, "Islam", P. Holt et al (Eds), *Cambridge History of Islam*, Cambridge, CUP, 1986. Vol. 2, and M. Haron, "Africa's Muslims: Expressing their Identity", James N. Amanze (Ed.), *Biblical Studies, Theology, Religious Studies and Philosophy: An Introduction for African Universities*, Nairobi, Kapf Chancery, 2010. Ch. 18, pp.363-379.

²⁴ M. Azevedo, "Religion in Africa", M. Azevedo (Ed.), *African Studies: A Survey of Africa and the African Diaspora*, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 1998. Ch. 22, pp. 387-404.

²⁵ E. Bongmba, "The Study of African Religions: A Sketch of the Past and Prospects for the Future", Anon (Ed.), *The Study of Africa: Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Encounters*, Dakar, CODESRIA, 2006, pp.338-374.

²⁶ E. Mandivenga, *Islam in Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1983 and J.Amanze, *Islam in Botswana*, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1999.

criticize Moyo (2007) too for having presented an unfair picture of Southern Africa's Muslims.²⁷

All of these academic outputs point to the fact that scholarly interventions should avoid offering superficial treatment of the region's Muslim communities. These communities deserve to be given the necessary academic attention in books and articles that intend to cover Islam in Africa. In other words, the researcher should adopt an even-handed approach when discussing this topic. He/she should not give his/her essay a broad inclusive title when it decidedly and exclusively only confined its focus to one particular country or a specific aspect. These scholars should, in other words, write works that provide insightful understandings of each of these communities so that one has a fair comprehension of the status and development of them regionally. Notwithstanding these comments and the afore-mentioned critical remarks, it is best at this point to turn to Schrijver's published and online work-in-progress text.

Revisiting Paul Schrijver's Contribution: A Critical Bibliographic Intervention

At the end of 2006, Paul Schrijver, who is attached to the Africa Centrum at Leiden University, produced his invaluable *Bibliography on Islam in Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa* (Leiden: African Studies Centre. asc Report 82/2006. pp. i-x & 1-275).²⁸ It was a work that occupied much of his time for more than two years. This bibliographical work focused on scholarly writings that have given all their attention to Islam in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.

Schrijver's work, which has thus been long overdue and certainly timely, acknowledged that his work should be seen as a *significant* (our word and emphasis) supplement and an update

²⁷ A. Moyo, "Religion in Africa", April Gordon & Donald Gordon Eds., *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, Boulder & London: Lynn Rienner, 2007, Ch. 11, pp. 317-350.

²⁸ M. Haron, "Schrijver's text: A *Bibliography on Islam in Contemporary sub-Saharan Africa* Leiden: asc", *Journal for Contemporary African Studies*, Vol.26, issue No.4, October 2008, pp. 453-456.

to the two earlier mentioned works on the topic. He stated in his three-page preface that he sourced his material from a variety of sources. For example, he perused an array of catalogues produced by numerous specialized institutions such as the UMI Dissertation Services and he also inspected works such as *Index Islamicus* (www.indexislamicus.com), *Muslim World Book Review* (www.islamic-foundation.org.uk/mwbr.html) and *Islam et Societes au Sud du Sahara* (www.icdpu.fr) to extract relevant material for this bibliography. Nonetheless, he —and many of us— profited substantially from the accessible websites such as ebsco and injenta, the available bibliographies on the internet, and the accessible published catalogues.

For the purposes of his publication, Schrijver decided to confine himself to a specific historical period (i.e. from 1960 to 2005) within which the material on Islam and Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa had been produced and he also restricted himself geographically to the sub-Saharan region. On this issue, one would like to express one's dissatisfaction because anyone interested in Islam on the African continent cannot ignore the fact that North Africa though Arab in character share various types of connections with other parts of Africa and should have been written into bibliographies such as this; its records may be inscribed in a limited rather than a comprehensive manner. For example, some of us who have been researching on Islam and Muslims in Southern Africa inevitably return to North Africa that has been the bedrock of Islamic renewal and revivalism from the middle part of the 20th century. Historically, the ideas of the Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood have filtered down to Southern Africa in different forms and have left an indelible impression upon the psyche of Muslims in the region. In one's opinion, it is by time that social science and humanities scholars view the African continent not in separate portions but as a whole and stop promoting the notion as if it's a divided continent.

On this note, this researcher visited AfricaBib.org during March 2017 and he discovered that Schrijver and colleagues continued to work on this bibliographical project. This resulted in the team

combining all countries on the continent (instead of reinforcing that divide between the Arab north and African south); hence the title "Islam in Africa". In addition to this, the team also lifted the time-frame restrictions that was imposed on the project and that confined itself between 1960 and 2005. Since the completion of the 2006 publication, the online AfricaBib.org team has been updating the site by sourcing the data from various publications and sites. As a result of these bibliographical developments, the site boasts that it consists of more than 7000 references. These are mainly made up of secondary material written in European languages about Muslims in Africa. Apparently, according to the AfricaBib.org site, many of its entries are accompanied by abstracts; some of which have been generated by ASC library staff, and others that had abstracts that were prepared or written by the authors, publishers, or the journals editors. And in addition, each of the entries/records has, where possible, online links that makes the full text immediately accessible.

Leaving aside some of the concerns, here the article selectively looks at the contents of this bibliography. Since the article's focus is on Southern Africa, it shall confine itself to those entries in Schrijver's text (blue line) and those that appear on the AfricaBib.org site (red line). But for the record, Schrijver divided his bibliography into nine sections that consisted of 4,293 entries. Since he did not lump SADC states under one category, this essay extracted the data from the relevant sections (i.e. East Africa and Indian Ocean Islands) and inserted all of them in the graph below. It will, however, be noted that some of the countries such as Angola, Namibia, and the Seychelles do not feature in his regional categories because there was, according, his findings no academic text that evaluated the Muslim communities in those countries. For the purpose of this article, these will all be included so that one gets a sense of the regional academic coverage, and it will hopefully cause potential researchers to consider undertaking research in those countries that have been neglected.

SADC States





Figure 1: SADC States: Research Outputs of Their Muslim Communities

The line graph shows that research has generally been uneven over the past five decades. Firstly, even though Muslim communities have emerged in countries such as Angola, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland, no research project has been developed by the universities in those countries nor have researchers from the region or Europe demonstrated any interest in looking at these communities. This scenario has, however, slightly changed sometime after Schrijver's text had been published. Secondly, in countries such as Botswana, Congo-Kinshasa, Madagascar, Mauritius, Zambia, and Zimbabwe efforts have been made by the academic institutions' staff to make a contribution in this direction. Their outputs are rather limited even though opportunities for research are wide open.

In the Line Graph B above, the researcher chose to place the Indian Ocean nations in a separate figure even though two of the four nations are not SADC members. In fact, if the Comoros and Reunion are excluded then the amount of outputs is a meagre 22 as opposed to 61. And when one compares this graph with Line A graph then it will be observed that the amounts are almost the same; in this group, Botswana had the lowest, and Malawi had the highest. The latter result is somewhat surprising since Mozambique has a far larger Muslim population (17%) than Malawi (12%) (See Table 1).

Returning to Figure 1, one noted that the Muslim communities in Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa enjoyed a fair amount of attention by local and international scholars. Whilst Malawi and Mozambique's respective totals together add up to only 54, Tanzania's tally was double that amount. South Africa outstripped them all by more than 200% with a total of 386 as reflected in the bar graph below. Earlier reference was made to a handful of South African and European researchers who had done a sterling job in this sector. Abdulkader Tayob, for example, produced many conference papers, journal articles, and book chapters that complemented his few books that focused on South Africa's Muslims; and in 2010 he completed a very useful online "Islam in Africa" guide for researchers.²⁹ And he was joined by a few European scholars who investigated and explored various dimensions that uncovered the identity of this Muslim community; this is something that one would like to see being done when studying Muslim communities in South Africa's neighboring states and those lying further northwards.

South Africa's Neighbours and Their Indian Ocean Nations



²⁹ Abdulkader Tayob, *Islam in Africa: A Bibliographic Guide*, Oxford, OUP, 2010. Retrieve from www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com. This was to some extent complemented by P. Limb's "Islamic Africa: A Select, Annotated Webography", *Islamic Africa*, Vol.5, issue No.1, 2014, pp.91-102.

From among the SADC nation-states South Africa and Tanzania's Muslim communities have been under the radar screens of various national and international researchers. A closer look at Figure 3 and Figure 1 reveal that South Africa was given a substantial amount of attention compared to each of the other communities. Though one may wish to list a few reasons for this, it shall be left for another essay to evaluate. Returning to the statistics, as they appear in the mentioned figures and when ranking the outputs as they appear in these graphs then it is evident that South Africa stands on top of the list; this is, however, only by a small margin. In fact, the output, according to Schirjver's records, for South Africa was just below 400 as at 2006 and just over 500 as at the beginning of 2017 and for Tanzania it was at 100 in 2006 and this has doubled by the beginning of 2017.

South Africa and Tanzania: A Comparative Overview




Figure 3: A Comparative Overview – South Africa and Tanzania

Towards a Conclusion

In the introduction, it was stated that the purpose of this article was to avoid giving a detailed insight into the social history of the Muslim communities in Southern Africa. We did so because our basic objective was to provide a superficial sketch that helped

one to be able to have a glimpse into these communities through the extant scholarly outputs that appeared over the fifty years (circa 1965-2015). In other words, it reflected specifically on the scholarly outputs that tangibly illustrated the scholarly outputs related to SADC's Muslim communities over the said period. Since these outputs were contained and catalogued in Schrijver's 2006 bibliography as well as his online AfricaBib.org work-in-progress, the study drew upon these to (a) compare the number of outputs that were completed by the end of 2005 to those that were published by the beginning of 2017; (b) provide an overview and understanding of areas that have been (adequately) researched over the five decades, and to (c) point to a set of themes/topics that researchers neglected to explore and that should be given attention by future researchers.

By and large, the article underlined that the compilation of reference works such as a bibliography on Southern Africa's Muslims is not only an onerous task but it is an invaluable one. It is priceless because the (up-to-date) catalogue, which consists of most - if not all - the entries related to a specific Muslim community in the SADC region, acts as a precious companion to the researcher or the scholar who desires to further explore and examine aspects of that community. And towards the end, the article illustrated to what extent these scholarly outputs — regionally and internationally— contributed towards the formation of an "emerging Muslim Civilization" in the Southern African region. Put differently, the catalogue of entries demonstrated that though Southern Africa's Muslims remain numerically smaller than their counterparts who reside in East and West Africa, they made indelible inputs to the region to such an extent that social scientists have had to factor in their overall contributions in, inter alia, the fields of literature and linguistics, the clothing industry, the building sector, and in the financial arena.

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Observations on the Relations of the Subcontinent Muslims with the Ottomans

Azmi Özcan*

ABSTRACT

The article broadly examines the relations between the Subcontinent Muslims and the Ottomans in a historical context, and in particular focuses on how this relationship evolved in the aftermath of colonialism with regard to the role of the Caliphate. The analysis starts with Muslim Turks' first entry into the Indian Subcontinent from the beginning of 11th century onwards with Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni and concludes that from that time on mutual relations became part of the histories of respective nations. Accordingly 15th century marked the Ottomans' ascendancy into the world stage and gaining the reputation as the stronghold of Muslim power in the West. In this sense, the conquest of Istanbul, the capital of Byzantine Empire, in 1453 evoked remarkable veneration among the Indian Muslims. In line with this development, letters of congratulation and jubilation were sent and some Muslim rulers sought to establish diplomatic relations. Sultan Selim's assumption of the universal Caliphate in 1517 gave a new dimension in forging relations. As the Muslims in India lost their power against the Western colonizers they developed a kind of spiritual attachment to the Ottoman Sultan and the Caliphate which lasted until the end of Ottoman State.

* Prof. Dr. Azmi Özcan, University of Sakarya, Turkey.

Introduction and Historical Overview

Muslim Turks first initiated entering the subcontinent in an organised way with Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni from the very beginning of 11th century onwards. The rise of the Ottoman Turks in the 14th century drew the attention of the Subcontinent Muslims. From the 15th century onwards, the Ottomans gained a reputation as the stronghold of Muslim power in the West. Furthermore, the conquest of Istanbul, the capital of Byzantine Empire, in 1453 evoked remarkable veneration. Subsequently, letters of congratulation and jubilation were sent to salute and to pay respect to the Ottomans and some Muslim rulers sought to establish diplomatic relations with them.¹ There were also commercial relations between Gujarat merchants and the Ottomans. In 1517, Sultan Selim's assumption of the universal Caliphate² gave a new dimension in forging relations with other Muslim countries.

Indeed, the Ottomans extended their interest beyond their own territories. Sultan Selim I, wanted to help the ruler of Gujarat, Muzaffer Shah, against the Portuguese because the rise of Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean posed a serious military threat to the Muslim states and their seaborne trade. Additionally, the pilgrim route of Indian Muslims to the Holy Places of Islam

¹ H. Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London 1973, p. 126.

² 3 As is known, the institution of the Caliphate, which started with the election of Abu Bakr (632-634) after the death of the Prophet represented an aspiration for an ideal political unity of all Muslims under one leader. The first four caliphs Abu Bakr, Omar (634-644), Osman (644-656) and Ali (656-661) were referred to as *Khulafa-i Rashidin*, impersonating the idealized conception of the institution. With the Umayyads (661-750), the institution was transformed into a kind of monarchy. In 750, the Abbasids took over the title Caliphate until the destruction of Baghdad, by the Mongols in 1258. The institution was, however, restored by the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt and they allowed the descendants of the Abbasids to retain their title but without any power. According to Ottoman tradition, the last Abbasid Caliph, al-Mutawakkil, transferred the Caliph title in 1517 to the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I (1512-1520). When Sultan Selim I extended his rule over Arabia and Egypt in 1517, he also assumed the title of *Khadimu'l-Haramayn al-Sharifayn* (Servant of the Holy Places), which had been the symbol of religious supremacy among the Muslim kingdoms.

had also been endangered. The first Ottoman fleet landed at Diu in 1531 with a force of two thousand men.³ This was followed by the other greater expeditions.⁴ This was the time in the subcontinent when the Baburid rule had already been established in 1526.

The earliest references to the Baburids in Ottoman sources go back to the first half of the 16th century,⁵ but there is no record of any official link until Jahangir's reign (1605-1627). It is said that Akbar (1556-1605) at the very beginning of his reign sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan accepting him as the Caliph of the age.⁶ As Akbar consolidated his power, he developed a cold attitude towards the Ottomans, which led him to claim the title of Caliph for himself. This was also demonstrated in an attempt to form a triple alliance with the Safavids in Iran and the Uzbeks against the Ottomans.⁷ Evidently, Shah Jahan (1627-1658) was the first Baburi ruler to set up regular diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. He sent a mission and wrote a letter to Sultan Murad IV calling him as the "Khan of the Muslim kings". Moreover, his diplomatic mission was the first of several exchanges between

³ M. Y. Mughul, "Turco-Pakistan Relations in Historical Perspective", *Grassroots XII & XIV*, University of Sind, 1988, pp. 86-87.

⁴ For example, Seydi Ali Reis wrote a travelogue called *Miratu'l-Memalik* (The Mirror of the Countries) Seydi Ali not only gave valuable information about the political and cultural conditions of 16th century India, but also furnished details about the people he had met and the places he had visited during his long and difficult journey from Surat to Turkey. Seydi Ali Reis, *Mir'atul Memalik* (ed.), N. Akyıldız, İstanbul, n. d. 47.

⁵ B. Lewis, "The Mughals and the Ottomans", *Pakistan Quarterly*, vol. VII, issue no. 2, 1968, p. 5.

⁶ A. Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, 1964, 28; J. N. Sarkar, "Asian Balance of Power in the Light of Mughal-Persian Rivalry in the 16th and 17th Centuries", *Studies in the Foreign Relations of India*, pp. 205-206. M. Mughul, "Turco-Pakistan Relations", *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁷ J. N. Sarkar, "Asian Balance of Power...", pp. 205-206; B. Lewis, "The Mughals", *op. cit.*, p. 7. Feridun Bey, *Münşeat-ı Selatin*, Constantinople, 1848, vol. II, p. 280. Naima Tarihi, İstanbul n. d. III, p. 357, N. R. Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations: A Study of Political & Diplomatic Relations between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire, 1556-1748*, Delhi, India: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1989, pp. 26-35 and p. 195.

the two Muslim rulers.⁸ During the reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707), official contacts between the Baburids and the Ottomans appeared to be at their lowest ebb possibly because of the risk of a land journey or due to the unstable situation in Iran, and the dangers of a sea route.⁹ The chaos that was prevalent in the subcontinent after the death of Aurangzeb was perhaps the most effective reason. However, by the end of the 17th century, earlier contacts were already paving the way for closer cultural and commercial relations like the constant flow of pilgrims to Mecca and the growing popularity of the Sufi orders in both countries.¹⁰

Colonial Rule, Debates on Caliphate and Intensification of Relations

After the death of Aurangzeb, Muslim power gradually disintegrated and the British power consequently made a great impact upon the minds of Muslims. For the first time, they had to experience how to live as the subjects of an alien power. Thus, by the end of the 18th century, in the midst of growing despair and confusion, they started developing a kind of attachment to the Ottoman Sultan as the most prestigious Muslim ruler and even as a Caliph.¹¹ Thus, it was, perhaps because of this gradual consolidation of the supremacy of the Ottomans, that the Muslim rulers of South-

⁸ A. Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, 1964, pp. 37-38; Cihan Oruç, *Şah Cihan Döneminde Babürlü-Osmanlı Diplomatik İlişkileri*, Vakınuvis, II, 2, 2017, pp. 191-215.

⁹ İzzî Süleyman Efendi, *İzzî Tarihi*, 13. İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pt. II, 150-156; Riaz-ul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, vol. II, Karachi, 1982, Sec. 10; Y. H. Bayur, "Osmanlı Padişahı II. Süleyman'ın Gürkanlı Padişahı Alamgir (Evrenşib)'e Mektubu", *Belleten*, vol. XIV, no. 53, 1950, pp. 268-287.

¹⁰ M. Y. Mughul, "Turco-Pakistan Relations...", *op. cit.*, 8. A. H. Ali Nadwi, *Muslims in India*, trans. by M. A. Kidwai, Lucknow, 1969, p. 49-50; A. Rashid, *op. cit.*, p. 544.

¹¹ Quoted in Abul Kalam Azad, *Khilafat and Jazirat-ul Arab*, (trans.) by M. A. Qadi, Bombay, 1920, p. 183-184. A. Ahmad, "An Eighteenth-Century Theory of the Caliphate", *Studia Islamica*, vol. XXVIII, 1968. G. N. Jalbani, "Pan-Islamism", *Islamic Literature*, Feb. 1967, pp. 9-12.

West India sought help from the Ottoman Sultan and even felt the need to obtain the Caliphal investiture from him. Hereafter, the pattern of relationship was to change. Among those who approached the Ottomans for help were the rulers of the Malabar and Mysore Kingdoms. Even the Governors of Deccan, Nizamul Mulk (1748) Nasr Jang (1748-1751) tried to obtain help from the Ottomans by addressing the sultan as "Caliph of the Holy Prophet".¹² By that time the British, too, aware of this growing attachment, were sensing that their interests in the Subcontinent were somehow related to their relations with the Ottomans, relations that might have an effect upon the Subcontinent Muslims.

The outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 in which the Ottomans fought against the Russians in alliances with the British and French was the first event during which Indo-Muslim sympathy and concern for the Ottomans was evidently demonstrated through various means. There were even cases, in which money was collected for the wounded during the war. The government did not miss the opportunity to try to impress the Subcontinent Muslims by posing as the defender of the Sultan and his empire. It had already become very clear that the notion of the Sultan Caliph was emerging as a major mobilizing factor among the Subcontinent Muslims. The British were to take full advantage of this during the events of 1857. In 1857, the mutiny of a group of native army of sepoys was soon followed by a civil uprising with the aim of overthrowing the British hold on the Subcontinent. During the mutiny, the British took full advantage of the help they had given to the Ottomans during the Crimean War. They not only obtained permission from the Porte for the passage of their troops to the Subcontinent through Egypt and Suez,¹³ but also secured a proclamation from the Sultan, as Caliph, advising the

¹² M. N. Qureshi, *The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924*, (Ph.D. thesis), University of London, SOAS, 1974, p. 19.

¹³ The British Government thanked the Porte for the permission, İrade Hariciye, 7906 of 1274, BOA; But the route was not used due to technical difficulties. Y. H. Bayur, *Hindistan Tarihi*, vol. III, p. 317.

Muslims not to fight against them. This proclamation was said to be circulated and read in the mosques of the Subcontinent.¹⁴

As the mutiny entailed the loss of the last vestiges of Muslim power in the Subcontinent, it was a great blow to the Muslims. Since there was no Muslim sovereign left, the Ottoman Sultan Caliph appeared to be the natural focus for the emotional and spiritual attachment of the Muslim rank and file. Hence followed the inclusion of the Ottoman Sultan's name in the Friday sermons. This practice started in the Subcontinent soon after the mutiny, possibly in 1862-1863.¹⁵ It was therefore not surprising to see an unprecedented scale of pro-Ottoman expression of sentiment and excitement during the Eastern crisis of 1876 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Until the Eastern crisis in the mid-1870's, the Subcontinent Muslims had believed that the Ottomans were as strong as other European states. In this belief, they found some degree of consolation for their own loss of power and prestige.¹⁶ Hence they followed the events in the Balkans and Eastern Europe with keen interest and anxiety. Their main concern was to defend and to support the Ottomans. They held numerous meetings throughout the Subcontinent and sent addresses to the British government requesting them to side with the Ottoman Empire against Russia and her Balkan allies. Again, prayers were offered for the success of the Sultan Caliph, subscriptions were raised for the relief of Ottoman soldiers, and large sums of money were remitted to Istanbul.

The extent of the pro-Ottoman stands and sentiments was reflected in the newly developing Muslim press. All sectors within

¹⁴ Abul Kalam Azad, *op. cit.*, p. 186; Also see Azmi Özcan "1857 Büyük Hind Ayaklanması ve Osmanlı Devleti", *İstanbul Üniversitesi (İ.Ü.) İslam Tetkikleri Dergisi*, vol. IX, 1995, pp. 269-280. İrade Hariciye, 7903, Lef, 1, BOA; FD. Poll. 9 Dec. 1857, no. 45, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.

¹⁵ YEE, 30, 1499, 51, 78, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA).

¹⁶ Temple to Lytton, 27 Jan. 1878, *Lytton Papers*, 519/7. IOR. Nizamul-Akhbar, 14 Aug. 1876; Najmu'l-Akhbar, 24 Jan. 1877, L/R/5/54. Also see the year 1876, L/R/5/53, *India Office Records (IOR)*.

the society, the educated as well as the illiterate, were eager to receive the latest information on day-to-day developments in Turkey. Such interest led to the inception of many journals which exclusively devoted space to the publication of Turkish news.¹⁷ Amidst such anxiety and excitement, some sections of the Muslim community linked their future with the fate of the Ottoman Empire as it was symbolized in the person of the Sultan Caliph and his Empire was viewed as a source of Islam's pride.¹⁸ The concerns were manifested generally in two respects; (a) The establishment of a large number of organizations to raise subscriptions and the opening of relief funds; (b) resolutions were drawn up appealing to the Queen and the British government to defend the Ottomans. There was almost a conspicuous unanimity in the Muslim community in support of the Ottomans. From the beginning, the Shiis also identified themselves with the common cause, and some influential Shii individuals, like Badruddin Tyabji and Syed Amir Ali even took the lead.

Apart from offering moral and financial support, there were also calls upon Muslims to go to the Ottoman lands and to fight against the Russians as volunteers. Hence, practical steps were taken; guidelines were published for volunteers who were willing to go to Anatolia, and some Muslims were reported to have gone there to participate in the war.¹⁹ But the most significant demonstration of Indo-Muslim concern was the enormous amount of money that poured into the relief funds opened throughout the country.²⁰

¹⁷ Nizamul-Akhbar, 14 Aug. and 18 Sept. 1876, L/R/5/53; Panjabi Akhbar, 10 Oct. 1878, L/R/5/55, IOR.

¹⁸ A. Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964*, London, 1967, p. 130; M. N. Qureshi, *The Khilafat Movement...*, p. 15., Aligarh Institute Gazette, 1 Nov. 1876, L/R/5/53, IOR.

¹⁹ Nusratu'l-Akhbar, 1 June 1877, L/R/5/54, IOR; Nuru'l-Anwar, 19 Sept. 1877, L/P/S/7/15, vol. 6, IOR; Panjabi Akhbar, 28 July 1877; The Lawrence Gazette, 4 Sept. 1877; Qudh Akhbar, 9 June 1877, L/R/5/54, IOR L/P/S/3/236 and 238, nos. 864, 254, IOR.

²⁰ "A Study of the Attempts for Indo-Turkish Collaboration against the British", *Proceedings of Indian Historical Congress*, (hereafter PIHC), ses. XXVII, Allahabad, 1954, pub. 1956, p. 345. Florence Nightingale, "The People of India", NC, Aug. 1878,

The British Indian government soon sensed the growing resentment among the Muslims because evidently the Muslim enthusiasm during the Russo-Turkish War was in many ways unique and unprecedented. It was unique because nowhere else in the Muslim world was there such a large-scale and heartfelt sympathy for the Ottomans and it was unprecedented because the public opinion for the first time manifested itself in an institutionalized form as a united body through several organizations and newspapers. Thus, by the time the war was over, it became clear that Abdulhamid's fame and prestige as the Caliph of all Muslims had reached even the remote villages of the Subcontinent. It was also clear to the British that the Muslims constituted a powerful pro-Ottoman public opinion which could not be ignored.

From the turn of the century until the deposition of Abdulhamid in 1909, pro-Ottoman manifestation of the the Subcontinent Muslim sentiments and concern was to remain deep-rooted. Its chief feature was the resentment felt at every attempt made by European powers, be it Britain or another, to coerce the "head of Islam". There was also a new vigour in that the Western-educated Muslims were also becoming more and more interested in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan Caliph.²¹ Consequently, issues like sending students to Istanbul and extending commercial relations between the Subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire, which had never been heard before, came to be discussed, though never materialized.²²

195, in M. Y. Abbasi, *The Genesis of Muslim Fundamentalism in British India*, N. Delhi 1987, p. 120.

²¹ For example, in 1900 the silver jubilee of the Sultan was celebrated with great joy and happiness virtually in every city of India. See, L/R/5/ 77 and 109, IOR., *Silver Jubilee of His Imperial Majesty Sultan Gazi Abdul Hamid Khan II.*, by B. A. Koor, Bombay 1900.

²² Especially Muhammed Inshaullah, the editor of *Al-Vakil*, was a prominent exponent of sending students to Turkey. FD. Sec. E, Apr. 1898, nos. 157-187, NAI. Y. A. Hus. 377-4, BOA. Later in 1907, 27 June 1907, I H Poll. P, Poss. 8959, IOR. In the second half of the 19th century the interest of the Subcontinent Muslims in the Ottoman affairs was also reflected in their works of literature. See Azmi Özcan, "The Turks in Urdu Literature in the Age of Pan-Islamism", *JPHS*, vol. XL, July

In a similar manner, the Hejaz Railway served as a living link between the Muslims of the Subcontinent and the Ottomans for quite a long time. It was regarded as a symbol of the capability of Muslims to resist European superiority by showing what the united efforts of the Muslims could achieve.²³ In the Subcontinent, too, the appeals for donations from Istanbul found a very encouraging response, and in a short time the Central Committee of the Hejaz Railway was formed at Haydarabad with branches in other major cities and tremendous subscriptions poured in.²⁴

In 1908, the success of its construction was hailed throughout the subcontinent as a sign that the Muslim Empire was still strong and capable of protecting Muslim interests as the guardian of the Holy Places. Not before long, however, this rejoicing was to be replaced by anxiety and despair about the future of the Caliphate and Islam beginning with the Young Turk revolution and the ousting of Abdulhamid II from the throne in 1909. Young Turk revolution was first regarded as a sign of the awakening of democracy.²⁵ However, this enthusiasm was shattered by the deposition of Abdulhamid II. There was, for a time, an outburst of anti-Young Turk denunciation in the Muslim press. The Young Turks were asked to admit their mistake and they were warned that the Subcontinent Muslims would have nothing to do with them.²⁶ However, it did not take the Muslims long to regain their

1992, pp. 245-250; G. H. Zulfikar, "Urdu Literature and the Turks", *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, vol. XXIV, no. 1, Jan. 1987.

²³ On the construction of the Hejaz Railway see, Muhammed Inshallah, *The History of the Hamidia Hedjaz Railway Project*, Lahore, n. d.; W. Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad*, Virginia, 1980; J. Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda*, Detroit, 1971; Ufuk Gülsoy, *Hicaz Demiryolu*, Istanbul 1995.

²⁴ FD. Sec. E, July 1905. nos. 239-245, NAI. " FD. Sec. E, Oct. 1906, nos. 239-264, NAI.

²⁵ A. Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, N. Delhi, 1978, pp. 6-7. M. Sadiq, *The Turkish Revolution and The Indian Freedom Movement*, Delhi 1983, p. 25.

²⁶ Najmal Husain, president of the All-India Shia Conference, to the G. of United Provinces (UP), 26 Dec. 1908. FD. Extnl. A, Feb. 1909, nos. 10-13. NAI; F O, 421/250, no. 281, PRO.

confidence in the new regime when it became clear that the Young Turks had realized the value of the Caliphate for the Empire, as well as for the support they needed from Muslims throughout the world.

Aftermath of the Balkan Wars

In November 1911, the Italians invaded Tripoli and Benghazi. The news of the war created a sensation in the Subcontinent. Once again subscriptions were raised and virtually hundreds of meetings were held throughout the country to express support for Turkey and to condemn what they regarded as "Italy's brigandage". The effects of the events in 1911 upon the Indo-Muslim mind proved to be significant in many ways. The disappointment and the disillusionment of the Muslims with the British indifference finally led to the crumbling of the long-cherished idea that Britain was the protector of the interests of the Muslims in the world in general, as well as those of her own subjects

While the war with Italy had a devastating effect on the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro formed an alliance and declared war against the Turks in 1912. In a matter of two months, the Ottoman army totally collapsed and virtually all the remaining European territories of the Empire were lost. When the news of the war was received, there was an intense reaction and a renewed upsurge of interest among the Muslims.²⁷ Furthermore, they demonstrated their support of the Turks through subscriptions.²⁸

²⁷ Between 1911-1913 Turkey lost about 424,000 square miles out of a total territory of about 1,153,000 square miles, and 5 million of her 24 million populations. Shaw and Shaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-300. M. N. Qureshi, *The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1924*, (Ph.D. thesis), University of London, SOAS, 1974, pp. 23-24. *Comrade*, 7 Oct. 1911. M. Hasan, *A Nationalist Conscience: M. A. Ansari the Congress and the Raj*, N. Delhi, 1987, p. 37.

²⁸ The total amount donated from all over the world was around L 256, 911. The list was read at the annual congress of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, May 1913. *Comrade*, 24 May 1913.

Among the endeavours made by the Muslims, two were most outstanding; the Indian Red Crescent Mission to the Ottoman Empire and the society of the *Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba*. The Red Crescent Mission performed eight months of meritorious and humanitarian service in Anatolia and returned to the Subcontinent in July 1913. During their stay, the mission carried out a great service for the relief of the suffering Ottomans. Based on their impressions of Ottoman Empire, the members carried on a vigorous pro-Turkish propaganda by a series of appealing articles, which were published in the Muslim press.²⁹

The formation of a society known as the *Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba* was first conceived to protect the Holy Places of Islam from non-Muslim aggression.³⁰ According to the promoters, the Ottoman Empire, the guardian of the Holy Places, was getting weaker and weaker and consequently the sanctity of the Holy Places was being endangered. Although the promoters claimed it to be a purely religious organization, it was soon to develop political overtones. In the process many centres were opened at several places.³¹ However, the greatest blow to the *Anjuman* was the start of World War I. as the *Anjuman* had to cease its activities during the War.

The British Foreign Office thought that it is necessary to prepare Indo-Muslim public opinion in the event of the Ottoman Empire

²⁹ H. Poll, A, Oct. 1913, no. 198; H. Poll, D, Jan. 1916, no. 33, NAI. Mainly in the *Comrade*, *Zamindar*, and *Al-Hilal*.

³⁰ "Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba", Sec. report, CIO, L/P&S/20 H. 37, IOR; H. Poll. A, Nov. 1914, nos. 33-38. NAI.

³¹ "Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba", Sec. report, CIO, L/P&S/20 H. 37, IOR; H. Poll. A, Nov. 1914, nos. 33-38. NAI; "Shaukat Ali, "Written Statement", ICP, Jan. 1919, 3-5, IOR; H. Poll. A, Oct. 1913, no. 118, NAI. From April 1913 onwards the society was regularly referred to in the Native press. H. Poll. D, 1913, no. 7, NAI. See for example *Al-Hilal*, 23 Apr. 1913; *Comrade*, 31 May 1913. See the *Dusturu'l-Amal* (The Rules of the *Anjuman*), H. Poll. A, May 1914, no. 46; H. Poll. B, June 1913 no. 108, NAI. Also, quoted at length in F. Robinson, *Separatism among the Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims 1860-1923*, Cambridge, 1974, 208; *Comrade*, 31 May 1913; Abdul Bari to the Prvt. Secy. to the Viceroy, 17 Mar. 1914, H. Poll. D, July 1914, no. 7, NAI.

joining the war on the side of the Germans through imposing strict censorship on newspapers. Therefore, prominent Muslim figures were jailed during the war.

The armistice of Mudros which was signed to end the hostilities on 30 October 1918 meant the total and unconditional surrender of the Ottoman Sultan.³² However, promises proved not to be promises and immediately after the signing of the armistice by the Turks, Istanbul, the seat of the Caliphate, was occupied by the Allied forces. The British entered Mosul, and on 15 May 1919 the Greeks marched into Izmir. In eastern Anatolia, the Allies were ready to hand over the entire region to the Armenians. The situation was almost hopeless.

Amid confusion came the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920 and it intended practically to dissolve the Ottoman Empire. But it was not to be accepted due to the growing national resistance led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later Atatürk) in Anatolia. In order to end the conflict altogether, the Lausanne Conference scheduled to begin on 21 November 1922. After several months of discussions, the treaty was finally signed on 24 July 1923, recognizing Turkish sovereignty over the lands almost constituting the present-day Republic.

The Emergence of Khilafat Movement

The Subcontinent Muslims had followed the developments and fervently reacted as its course unfolded. Towards the end of the war, this interest reached its climax and as from December 1918, they organized what is known as the famous Khilafat movement. The main objective was to save Ottoman integrity and sovereignty in the face of the threatening ignominy.³³

Local and regional Khilafat committees were also established

³² For the terms, *Hansard Parliamentary Papers*, 1919, pp. 25-27.

³³ A. C. Niemeijer, *The Indian Khilafat Movement*, Leiden, 1970, p. 80; S. Cöhçe, "Türk İstiklal Savaşı ve Hindistan Müslümanları", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* cilt (vol.): XIII / Mart 1997 / sayı (issue): 37.

all over the country. Mahatma Gandhi presided over the Delhi meeting. They asked for Indian representation at the peace conference and said that Istanbul should remain in the hands of the Turks. Finally, the Khilafat question was taken up by the three main representative bodies of Indian society: The All-India Muslim League, the newly-founded Central Khilafat Committee and the Indian National Congress. It was also decided to send a delegation to England.³⁴

An all-India Khilafat day was declared on 17 October 1919. Mahatma Gandhi issued statements to encourage the Hindus and the result was a huge success. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered at meeting places in different cities. In early 1920, a Muslim deputation of prominent figures met the Viceroy. They explained that the Khilafat was an essential religious institution and that its extinction would be a catastrophe that could not be tolerated by Muslims. They also drew attention to the numerous promises made in the past. The Viceroy replied that he would continue to impress on the government in London with the Muslim viewpoint and convince them of the gravity of the situation.³⁵

The Khilafat delegation also reached London on February 26, 1920 and had official talks with cabinet ministers. They expressed the Subcontinent Muslim view in a clear, full, and temperate way claiming that the Caliph was the defender of their faith and his spiritual and temporal authority must remain as it was. Additionally, they requested that the Turkish territories remain unspoiled.³⁶ However, the developments were not promising and they returned to Bombay in October 1920. The British Government's disregard of its assurances of fair treatment for the Turks was clearly a breach of promise.

The atmosphere was very tense and the leaders of the

³⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 3 Jan. 1919, K. K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement, 1915-1923, A Documentary Record*, Karachi 1972, pp. 60-64.

³⁵ Political and Secret Subjects File, 186/1920, IOR; K. K. Aziz, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-78.

³⁶ L/ P. S/10/895, 3344/1920, IOR.

community, Muslims and Hindus alike, described the question of the future of the Khilafat movement as "a matter of life and death". Hence, a new method of struggle was decided on, and that was that no one was to work in government offices in order to implement a policy of non-co-operation in which no force was to be used. This was regarded as a test of the popular feelings. On June 22, Gandhi wrote his famous letter to the Viceroy protesting the treatment of the Ottoman Empire by the Brits. This was followed by a fatwa sanctioned by hundreds of Muslim ulama forbidding Muslims to co-operate with the government in any way and in any form. In 1 August 1920 the non-co-operation policy started and shortly afterwards the movement had the overwhelming support of all sections of the community.³⁷

Initially, the policy gained ground peacefully, but as time passed, violence started creeping in then the country almost lapsed into anarchy and the spirit of uprising became evident everywhere. At this point, Gandhi felt that he should call off the policy and suspend the mass civil disobedience. This also, in a way, marked the end of the Hindu-Muslim alliance.³⁸

Another type of reaction to the Allies' treatment of the Ottoman Empire and Britain's disregard of Indians' aspirations was the *Hijra* (Migration) movement which started in the summer of 1920. It advocated the mass migration of Muslims from a land no longer viewed as *darul-Islam* to Muslim lands. Many *Hijra* offices opened in different parts of the country and thousands of Muslims were persuaded to join the *Hijra* movement. In August 1920 alone, it is estimated that around 25,000 people moved. Altogether 60,000 were estimated to have attempted emigration. The cold, diseases, humiliation, disillusionment, and the hardship of the journey had cost them dearly.³⁹ The Khilafat movement, though, lost its

³⁷ G. Minault, *op. cit.*, pp. 123, 143-145; A. C. Niemeijer, *The Indian Khilafat Movement*, Leiden 1970, pp. 141-142.

³⁸ I. H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, Karachi 1972, p. 265.

³⁹ P. C. Bamford, *The Histories of Non Co-Operation and Khilafat Movements*, p. 158, Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, *Freedom of Faith and its Price*, London, 1920, pp. 117-118.

momentum, given developments within the country, but it did not suddenly subside, for it was essentially linked with developments in Turkey.

The political changes made by the Turks themselves surprised the Subcontinent Muslims.⁴⁰ Six months later on 3 March 1924, the Khilafatists faced their biggest blow. The Turkish Parliament abolished the caliphate. It came as a great shock to them. They did not believe it at first. When the news was confirmed, they were bewildered, and it was immediately called a "blasphemy". Hence, the reaction of the Khilafatist leaders was even bitter. Ankara's decision was found to be against Islamic tenets. The Khilafat Conference met on 19 March 1924 to discuss the matter. The resolutions that were passed emphatically and unanimously denounced the abolishing of the caliphate. They had done everything that a subject nation could do for the Turks and put enormous pressure upon the British-Indian government. Besides that their heart-felt sympathy for and attachment to the cause of the Khilafat were beyond question.⁴¹

After the initial shock and furore, the Khilafatists, seeing that Ankara was not prepared to withdraw its decision, suggested that Mustafa Kemal Pasha accept the title of Caliph himself, but the Pasha found it repulsive and rejected.⁴²

⁴⁰ G. Minault, *op. cit.*, p. 202; A. C. Niemeijer, *op. cit.*, p. 51

⁴¹ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 March 1924; A. C. Niemeijer, *op. cit.*, p. 155. For the text, A. M. (ed.), Zaidi, *Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India*, N. Delhi, 1975-79, vol. IV, 613-619 cited in M. Sadiq, *op. cit.*, 119. See other reactions, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 11 March 1924; 15 March 1924; Abstract of Intelligence no. 19, for the week 10/5/24. f. 12/6/1, vol. XI B. N. 29. Also see, A. Rauf, *The Khilafat Movement in NWFP*, p. 75.

⁴² M. K. Öke, *Hilafet Hareketleri*, Ankara 1988, p. 122; See, Azad's letter to Haqiqat L/R/5/ NNR, no. 20/1924. IOR.

Conclusion

All in all, the Subcontinent Muslims, en masse, never accepted the *fait accompli* of the Turkish government. The abolishing of the Caliphate dramatically changed the political situation in the Subcontinent. The movement lost its political force and mass appeal, for it was deprived of its *raison d'être*. The unity of the various groups representing all walks of life and different sections of the community was no more to be. The leaders were even divided among themselves. It also contributed to the deterioration of Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. The Hindus began to stand aloof from the Muslims and communalist organizations among both groups began to gain ground. In this way, the ambitious Khilafat movement, though it lingered on for some time, slowly died.⁴³

⁴³ The Indian Annual Registrar continued to publish the news of Khilafat Conferences until 1933. K. K. Aziz, *op. cit.*, Appendix I, 33.