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architect and urban planner,

Director of the Urban Institute, in Mostar, a public company.

Urban Institute today

A public company, Urban Institute, is a professional organization of the greatest public importance, and it works as a professional service for the government of the city of Mostar. The Institute is financed from the state budget. It is also independent from the municipality, but works for the needs of the municipality, who is it's founder. The Institute is free to offer services on the market, as it is stated in its founding registration. The Institute cannot be entirely market oriented company, because urban planning is of highest social importance. Urban planning is a long term activity in which the interests of an individual, a society and politics overlap.

The Law for Spatial planing of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, that was passed in 1974 with few amendments, has been confirmed by this war's regulations, and is a valid basis for present and future activities of the Institute.

At this moment the Institute has more of a problem solving role rather than planing of the city development, due to the fact that the city has been destroyed in the war and reconstruction has priority over new construction.

The priority has been set to returning of the structural elements that ensure the continuity of the city, especially Mostar's rich architectural heritage, as a best example of the multi-ethnical and multi-cultural coexistence. This heritage has been systematically destroyed ever since the first days of the 1992 war. This destruction was carried out until all of the monuments' remains have been destroyed, with an aim of historic speculations and political manipulations that would indicate a start of "new history" with "big " national states in the East and the West, but without the Muslim Bosnian people. The intellectuals have been killed, along with all those who were in a position to help out the Bosnian people.

Until today, over 80% of the architectural heritage dating from the ottoman period (1468-1878) has been destroyed, along with the institutions that kept the documentary record of the heritage and history. This heritage represents the existence of the Bosnian state entity in the last 10 centuries.

In the course of development of the fascist ideas a proposal by the Croatian official representatives was made that Mostar is a Croatian city, which would be symbolized by a medieval suspended bridge with gothic towers, in the place of the Old stone Bridge, who have been destroying it, , for days and finally succeed on November 9 1993, with thousands of grenades.

Reconstruction of the Documentation Basis

The urban plans are being implemented on the basis of the plans made before the war, or to be put more precisely, from the documents that have not been destroyed. The process of the reconstruction of the documentation would be one of the first activities that should be initiated. In Mostar the creation of structural plan for the whole city, has started, in which experts from both sides are employed, and EUAM (European Union Administration for Mostar) would coordinate the work. Our basic idea is to work ahead of the politics, and on the basis of experts' opinion, make evident that the city is non-divisible. This is especially true for the infrastructural systems and natural resources of the city.

There is a great pressure for creation of the master plan for the city, but what is not understood is that it is unrealistic to make a plan until all the parameters are determined and data is analyzed. EUAM has a conceptual plan whose aim is to integrate the city into a one integrated city. In this respect it is possible to use the premises of this workshop, so the problems are properly defined and a framework is set that should be defined before a master plan or any other plans are produced. The workshop promotes ideas that are empirically determined and that should be analyzed, but in any case the ideas are a product of skilled young experts and enthusiasts. Similar activities emphasize the importance of careful, non-biased, approach to the problems and will influence the political decisions if continued and publicized.

Special attention should be devoted to the reconstruction of religious complexes, that have been the main targets of destruction. Many buildings from this fund are the buildings of exceptional historic value and should be carefully approached with extreme caution. For the reconstruction of historic buildings it is important that local experts and craftsmen are used, since they understand the local conditions and culture and the characteristics of the historic matrix. International professional help should be sought and obtained, because the local exerts have been either killed or driven away by the war.

The strategy of the reconstruction

Pool of Professional Resources

It is necessary through all segments, to reconstruct the experts pool. For this purpose the experts should be identified in Bosnia, but also outside Bosnia, and a planing team on the local level should be organized for the creation of a master plan. This work cannot be guided by the foreigners who do not understand the history and the characteristics of our culture. Work can be carried out by the foreign professionals, but under strict coordination of the local experts. At the local level we have already initiated the process; we need architects, urban planners, conservators, traffic engineers, hydro engineers, economists and many others from different fields. The State Institute for Urban planing has taken a responsibility to find and employ domestic qualified experts and to send them to Mostar. This is an ongoing process.

The reconstruction of the documentary base

It is necessary to create a strategic, structural plan, that would be used as a basis for creation of detailed master plan, defining specific urban-technical parameters for each individual building and that would serve as a basis for further implementation.

Creation of a new documentary database

The next step in the process is creation of analytical documentation, on the basis of which it would be possible to make a global or structural plan. Demographic picture should be determined with a population increase projections for the next ten years. This is of course determined by the global and local political outcomes, since politics are a limiting factor in the war, many questions remain unanswered. An example that illustrate this are the refugees, whose future is not certain, whether they remain where they are or whether they return to their homes. If the master plan is not defined so that it suits the real conditions, then we have a "paper urbanism" that has no real practical use, and it becomes the basis for future mistakes. Even before the war when we had a much more organized society, than it is now, we did not have an entirely realistic urban plan that corresponded to the authentic needs of the society. Depending on the degree on which the society is organized and aware, we have better or worse urbanism.

Possibilities of an international cooperation

Professor Amir Pasic and other Bosnian professionals living across Europe now, with their knowledge and experience could be of great help in the process of reconstruction. Furthermore that some of them have been already working, before the war, on the creation of the planning documentation in Mostar. Institutions like IRCICA and others could identify and contact international experts from all over the world who would, on some real projects, be able to help. Our main concern about the reconstruction of Mostar is lack of experts help. It is necessary that new professionals are educated and the existing are found and involved in the process of reconstruction. If an international post graduate urban conservation program is established in Istanbul, within it, existing maps and documents from Mostar could be used as basis for future projects and designs. This would greatly contribute to an overall study of the Mostar reconstruction.

New Bridge After Destruction Of The Stari Most

as described by Sead Pintul

8.10.95

Mostar was attacked twice: first time by the Serbian and Montenegrin armies, in fact, and the second time by the Croatian army and the Croatian defense militia--a part of the Croatian army in Bosna-Herzegovina, not a legitimate formation but an army. Regarding the second (Croatian) attack, which was much heavier [than the first], with much worse consequences for the town and more destruction, the question of the survival of the side of Mostar where the Bosnian people are depended on the survival of the bridge. If the bridge fell, our people could not go and pass over the Neretva, and they wouldn't be able to get to drinking water.

Another very important moment was [after the bridge fell] when there was panic on the right side of the river, where some Moslems live also, and the population wanted to flee to the left side [where the majority of Moslems lived], in which case the army would have lost motivation to defend that part of town and automatically the whole town would have fallen.

Therefore the question of the survival of the town depended strictly on the survival of the bridges. The fight for the bridges is something special for the town of Mostar and a very important element; we had very few means, in fact nothing: we were searching in houses, in burnt out houses, and industrial structures, for material for constructing a bridge. We went over the mountains on foot, because we were blocked [by troops], to reach some sort of material to build this bridge. This battle for the bridges was won, in the sense that we have always

had one or two [operating] bridges in reserve, and we would construct at night what they would destroy during the day.

To all of us, it was the hardest when the old bridge was destroyed, to all the people from Mostar, regardless of nationality; all over the world, it was also hard for all people of culture. To all people it was hard to see such an architectural work destroyed. This bridge, the historical structure, was built in 1565 at the time of the Turkish Empire and all over the world in the literature [of architecture and culture] it is mentioned as a work of exceptional architectural value.

For the first temporary bridge [in the place of the Stari Most] we devised a system by which a bridge could be erected in one night.

[On the foundations, reinforced concrete blocks were planted...in them I-profiles were dry set in holes lined with wire mesh to protect the concrete...and then filled with sand, so that if the arch was hit it would not be necessary to put all the wiring reinforcement in again, and so we would not have to do the foundation again. Then cables went over the arches and we made anchor blocs with hooks so it could join, and these cables [were anchored into] the concrete blocks...]

We had a lot of engineers in the army, [the construction of the new bridge] was done in one night, though the foundations were done before. The putting up of the bridge can be done in one night...Another system was for carrying people [and supplies] across river on cables. We have made the system since then work better with something called the pleat system, so we had a system of triangles, a more stable system, a system of holding onto this cable with pulleys, one up and one down...the biggest problem here was how to cross the big river in the springtime

(other bridges cross the river closer to the water), this is the other one we made, it's not important....

This one was made the day after the day of the destruction of the old bridge, the 31st of December. It was winter and the river was wild and it was impossible to go over with a boat or swimming, and we had to throw a cable from one side to the other to the people on the other side to catch the cable so we could pull the bridge together. We used a system of a fisherman's rod and tied lead to the cable [to throw it]. It's a very quick system of making bridges across big waters. We have made bridges in others ways before we reached this simple strategic method, because the cable is most resistant to grenades, with such a small diameter, and difficult to cut. This is the best way to build bridges in a war where there is the threat of shelling.

Before that we made bridges in other places using the spare metal rods from the hotel canopies. It was important to secure pedestrian transport across the river, to get a munitions and wounded people across. And we also had a basket system for transporting the wounded, on a pulley and cable system: the box would have doors on either end and it went really fast.

The destruction of the [old] bridge was the biggest shock the population and army of Mostar has ever lived through; nothing could ever hurt us so much. That was a horrible psychological stress. There was a big danger that the people on the left side of the Neretva--who were cut off by the destruction of the bridge--would panic and flee to the west side.

They had started moving to the west side over the other bridges, and at that moment I was in the commanding position and issued an order that one special unit of the army with helmets and shields and full gear go to the other side to strengthen the defense; not for the defense itself but for psychological

reasons for the people to see that it cannot happen that someone comes into their houses from the other side. So they could see that they were not cut off.

We have strengthened this with two special units and they went in to be with the people and those who had started to leave went back. it was needed to survive this crisis, critical moment. later, everything cooled down, and we had three other bridges, so it was not a bad as it seemed. All the other bridges were shelled as well, one of the others was damaged. We always made plans to have [one bridge] in reserve to avoid panic, to always have a bridge, and the smallest distance in town from one side to the other is where the old bridge was. All the other bridges were in places that did not guarantee safe passage; they were pretty low, so there was a possibility that in spring they would be flooded.

...For me the old bridge continued to live in another form; the spirit of the old bridge remained. That was very important to me.

We had in the professional sense the leadership of five engineers, four civil engineers, and one machine engineer. We found them all in one army unit near the place of the old bridge. We were missing master craftsmen to work on the bridge, since that economy had been destroyed, a lot was burned down and destroyed...so we called through the radio for craftsmen to come in and help us do this job. A lot of elderly people replied; old people who were not actively part of the city's defense, and they worked at home making these parts for the bridge. They all worked together to solve some machinery details. We lacked a lot of things: we had no [special] parts, and no electrodes, so we looked for them in private homes and we carried these things from far away places and so we made the bridge practically out of nothing.

I walked 30 kilometers to find special elements to link the cables. Some pieces which were standard and easy to find under normal circumstances were missing. In the wartime everything was burnt down and we lacked everything. Jablanica is 48 away from Mostar, and we were blocked, and the only pedestrian connection was through Prenje. I walked to Jablanica on foot to find these parts and I brought them back in the rucksack on my back. This was for the old bridge itself. [First bridge after the destruction.] We had some parts, but not enough. I remember that we needed these parts for other bridges too, and I found a place in Jablanica, the UNIS factory, which was still working, and thereafter they made these parts for us.

...Out of all this destruction and killing, we became stronger every day. This was something that no one could understand. I think that psychologically a man in this situation goes inwards [like a branch bends down] and he finds some kind of force in himself. It was a question of survival, biological survival. Will you and your family be killed? Will everything be destroyed?People became much stronger; children grew up overnight. Children came themselves to ask for guns, small children. We had children 14-15 years old taking guns, and no one could make them go home. A son of our friend didn't want to go home. He was 16 years old, and he didn't want to home at all. He finally went home because the legal system does not allow children to fight. But an enormous reaction [rebellion] came when the bridge fell, and I think that it formed some kind of a system then in the sense of stronger actions creating stronger reactions.

People died and we stopped crying for them, and dying was a part of everyday life. Everyday we had 5-20 dead people. Mostly civilians, casualties of all the grenades that fell: 1000-2000 a day. From the hills they would see people go to the water, and if there were bigger groups they would shell. There were cases when no one was there to bury a dead person, so it became so

normal that people did not go to funerals at all. If you wanted to be a good citizen, you would have to go to a funeral each day in the evening. So because of all this, from day to day people became more and more strong. This was also a remark of the UN and European observers, even the negotiators had a feeling that we were undestroyable. As long as one person was alive, the part of the town where that person was secure. That is in fact how it was, I felt it this way.

Koshnick annual report

European union administration in Mostar
23 July 1994: beginning of mandate

I took over my position in the town which only a few months ago was the witness of a fierce fight. The war conflict not only left hate, mistrust, and political opposition, but also an unbelievably physically destroyed town.

The population, especially in eastern Mostar, lived in terrible conditions, with up to 70% of the flats destroyed, forcing people to live in the basement, where for more than a year they lived without electricity or running water and the economic life was totally stopped. Accordingly, our task was to secure the basic needs of the community, create humanitarian plan, reconstruction of public buildings, and the revitalization of the economy. In all of these we have had good results.

Water & electricity

Repair of the water and sewage system is complete and since march 1995 all of Mostar has had adequate service, except the high elevation zones. The reservoirs and their sources work well. The pipes are mostly repaired. With many hardships we also managed to (beginning in March) bring electricity to eastern Mostar for domestic uses. Since then, all households have normal electricity, but the problem of creating energy is still unsolved.

We need either new generators for the sake of planned industrial sites or the use of the hydroelectric plants on the river which suffered in the war. One such plant, the Salakavo, which is out of the [municipal] zone, is the biggest generator in the region and the question of its control is still the main point of contention between the two sides. I have offered my help in the negotiation process regarding this plant. Our political goal was to unite the existing system of public buildings [and utilities] on both sides; this could be realized if political accomplishments allow it.

Food

The population of Mostar has lived mostly on humanitarian aid: constituting 90% of all food in the east and 70% in the western sector of Mostar. This help was given from UNHCR, non-governmental organizations also contributed in large amounts. The European Union was obliged to cover the needs beyond this, and solicited governmental and private donations to do so. We have given much support to help start a program to reactivate agriculture. About 40,000 people were involved in this program, and the harvest of vegetables has already begun.

Repair of housing fund

The first RHF program started in 1994 and is now complete. It includes the repair of more than 3,500 houses along with the repair of water and sewer lines for 1,929 apartments. This year's program includes the repair of 4 cooperative apartments with 173 units, 200 badly damaged houses, and the continuing repair of infrastructure for these complexes.

Schools

One of our priorities was the repair of schools in order to hasten the normalization process for children. In the fall of 1994, after a 2 year interruption, classes began for 1,200 Mostar children. To date, 12 schools have been repaired, with 5 more to follow. We have completed a winter preparation program for the secondary school, the reconstruction of the medical school in the western sector, and a textile school in the eastern one. By the beginning of 1996, all preschools will be repaired and re-opened.

Health and social services

A primary goal was to re-establish a common health care system for all of Mostar. The health development program to date involves the restoration of a western sector home for the elderly and a plan for a similar home on the eastern side, the reconstruction of a clinic and hospital for mothers and children on the eastern side, support for the Velmos hospital on the east side, and the creation of a common center for training of health service professionals to be completed by the end of July 1995.

Infrastructure and transport

The European Union Mostar Administration created a new public company for public transport which started in May with 12 buses and 7 routes. The lack of freedom of movement disables east-west lines.

Priority has been given to bridge reconstruction, which is not at all unimportant due to the political and symbolic value involved with the processes of renovation and uniting of the two sides. Already after 2 months I have opened Tito's bridge, built by British and Spanish engineers in the town center. On the western side, in Potoci, we have reconstructed other bridges and restored two provisional pedestrian bridges with STABAT. Work on the customs bridge, the only bridge linking the Croatian side to the Bosnian side, is in process.

Economic reactivation

From the beginning, we have seen the renewal of the economy as an important part of the process of stabilization. Up to now, we have three accomplishments:

- provision of financial support to local companies, both small and large, such that 80 large firms and over 300 craftspersons and shops received help
- improvement of export opportunities for local producers
- creation of a program for training local governors and others.

All these programs were well-received by local authorities, workers, and experts; The creation of several hundred new jobs will be complete by October of 1995.

Cultural life, youth, and sports

Cultural activities in Mostar have slowly started again. Our main goals are the creation of special youth programs, student exchanges, and the reconstruction of the youth center. Also, a development program for sport facilities is planned.

Political achievements

When we turn to the political elements of our mandate, our achievements were more modest, mainly due to the obstruction and politics of rejection on the Croatian side. From the time of the negotiations for the Memorandum of Understanding, the Bosnian Croats have disliked the idea of European Union authority in Mostar. Only when it is treated as a crucial part of the Croatian-Muslim federation, and with the additional pressure of the international community via Zagreb, most Bosnian Croats have accepted the presence of the EUAM.

Among the ranks of local religious, military, and political leaders on the Croatian side of Mostar, the idea still exists that [the EUAM] is an imposed system which they have to tolerate, along with a set of political goals which they do not share and do not give political support to.

The Croatian leaders object to the idea of the EUAM serving one inseparable Mostar. Since the EUAM was offered as help to both sides, formed on the basis of cooperation and help, not force, we do not have any means to force either side to unite. So we have been trying to employ political and legal tools to govern an undivided Mostar, but we did not have the administrative authority to apply such a mandate without the approval and cooperation of local political factions.

This resulted in a basic political conflict, especially regarding the Bosnian Croats during the first year of the EUAM.

It is obvious that the Croatian side accepted and even asked for our financial and technical help for reconstruction of the western part of the town and for the revival of its economy, but the Croats have delayed whenever there was the suggestion of proceeding further towards unity. In this respect, they have shown neglect for their existing responsibilities as articulated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

As far as political achievement is concerned, the history of the first year of the EUAM is a history of endless discussions with local Croatian leaders on many sensitive subjects including:

- Establishment of a common police force, as prescribed in the Memorandum of Understanding section #13
- Freedom of movement for the Muslim population
- The return of refugees to their homes on the western side of the Neretva
- The political concept of a united Mostar and united administration for the whole town

A thorough explanation of our efforts in these areas will follow.

The progress was slow. It has become increasingly obvious that the local Croatians still hold on to the basic desire to preserve the old line of conflict in the center of the town as the division between two separate parts of the city of Mostar.

As it was explained, we did not have the means to make the Croatian side assume a position more in harmony with our mandate. Calls for accountability regarding the tenets of the Memorandum of Understanding so far have not been of any help. The Herzegovinian Croatians have learned in the past to sign agreements and not to honor them.

So we were left with two instruments:

- The use of reconstruction funds as a political leveraging tool and
- The continuing *demarche* to the Croatian government in Zagreb.

Although the Croatians want and need financial help, they have said that they cannot be bought with European money. A severance of financial help to western Mostar would result in an end to cooperation between the two sides, thereby bringing into question our ability to assist eastern Mostar, since all the supplies to Mostar come over Croatian territory....

I have met several times with President Tudjman and also the foreign affairs ministers and the defense ministers to review the situation. They have always assured me that Zagreb has a "strategic interest" in the success of the European Union Mostar Administration and that we could count on the full cooperation of the Croatian government. Unfortunately, the results of these *demarches* have been, all told, unsuccessful. Political influence and the pressure applied from Zagreb has forced local Croatian representatives to fulfill only some of their promises.

The limited effectiveness of international pressure in Mostar can be understood in light of several negative factors:

- The Bosnian-Croatians have not developed into a body capable of living independently or into a functioning body at all. It still needs external help and coercion...both Croatians in Mostar and Herzegovina refuse to unite the city at a pace close to the general pace of integration in Bosnia as a whole. The uncertain destiny of the Croatian minorities in central Bosnia serves as an excuse for Croatian stubbornness in Mostar.
- Since the political outcomes in the whole region are unclear the peace process has been hampered on the local level.
- The Herzegovinian-Croatians, even though in numerous ways dependent on the Croatian fatherland, have preserved a remarkable level of independence and influence. In Zagreb the problems of European Union Mostar Administration--and by extension, the difficulties the Zagreb government might encounter with the European Union--have obviously not reached a point critical enough to hasten decisive measures regarding Mostar.
- Local leaders of the Croatian Democratic Community Party (HDZ) are a special brand of nationalists. Furthermore they are closely related to the local military commanders and even some gang leaders. Though it is questionable whether they could continue to win approval from the normal Croatian citizens in Mostar, their financial means, their command over police, their links with organized crime, and their employment of the local media as instruments of propaganda make them terrifying "masters of war". They successfully play on fears in their own community, suggesting that the silent occupation of Mostar by the Muslim minority threatens Croatian identity in the city. An integrated Mostar is not in their personal nor political interest; some leaders are considered war criminals, and as such are unacceptable to the Bosnia population (the same applies to some leaders of the Bosnian military command regarding the likelihood of acceptance on the Croatian side.) To overcome the resistance of these leaders will truly be a trial of the declared politics of Zagreb, revealing whether it will support the Croat-Muslim federation in general and for Mostar in particular.

On the other side, the Bosnian side, we have almost an entirely opposite situation. The local Muslim population can only gain from the success of the European Union Mostar Administration. It is caught between two hostile territories, with the Serbs on the east and the Croatians on the west, squeezed between them on a narrow strip of land.

The concept of a united and open Mostar is for now their only hope to overcome their isolation, regain access to communication lines, revive their economy, and regain their homes in the western half of Mostar. They are interested, therefore, in the opening and uniting of Mostar. They view the European Union Mostar Administration as a political and legal band that links the two halves of their city.

For Bosnians, more than for us, the political process is too slow and unsatisfying; that is why they have now started a campaign that openly criticizes the recent political achievements in Mostar. They failed to acknowledge that their support for the ideal of unification would have been better served if their Muslim brothers had offered more support for the minorities of Croatians in central Bosnia. In addition, there is evidence

that limited sharing of power with Croatian junior partners in Sarajevo created hatred and, in turn, consolidation of the Croatian position in their Herzegovinian stronghold.

In the following fields there has been little improvement:

Freedom of movement

The freedom of movement in Mostar is more limited than in any other city in the federation. There are many reasons for this. Above all there is hatred, suspicion, and mistrust still present due to the fighting between Croats and Muslims--a conflict which in many ways resembles a civil war. The people know who killed whom, who has driven whom out of their apartment, and who has taken whom to the concentration camps, and these memories will not fade out over night.

In addition to this, partly because there are so few Croats living in the eastern sector (less than 100) and also because the living conditions are much harsher in the eastern side, there is no stimulus for Croats to cross over the dividing line. Furthermore Croats have full freedom of movement, because all of Herzegovina and Croatia is open to them. In other words, all problems of freedom of movement are Bosnian problems, and all of the concessions that must be made [very unwillingly] are from the Croats.

In the course of the last year some six contracts have been signed that have offered some minor but significant concessions, but even these the Croatian police have ignored in many cases. The basic problem is centuries old in the Balkans: the documents are signed and subsequently either torn up or ignored. Currently, one of our specific concerns is to increase the number of people [women, children, those not eligible for military service] to be able to cross daily the river. Presently that daily quota is 250 total crossings in both directions....

Additionally, we have had increasing problems with the Croatian police regarding the recognition of European union Mostar administration badges issued to people whose work is works demands that they cross on a daily basis (doctors, reconstruction officials, etc.). This special access privilege results in problems created by Croatian police on a daily basis. Clearly there are many influential Croats who do not wish to see one Muslim in western Mostar. For now we have stopped the bimonthly meetings regarding freedom of movement in the town because they have proven so upsetting and have resulted in little progress. Instead, we initiated talks on this subject with Croats on a higher level in order to achieve better results.

The official Croatian position at this moment promises few concessions until a political agreement has been made on a higher level about the future status of Mostar. Inevitably such an agreement would lead to a significant improvement, but currently Croatian obstruct any type of improvement. If some political solution is not achieved in the near future, which is improbable, then a significant increase in the freedom of movement for Mostar's inhabitants is not foreseen.

Unique police force

It is our goal, as stated in section 12 of the memorandum of agreement, that a unique police force is established under my command. The police forces provided by the western European union are to be consultants and aides in the creation of these forces. We still have two separate police forces, and the Croatian police definitely do not respect any authority.

An obstacle to progress in this area since the inauguration of the European union Mostar administration has been the unwillingness of the west Mostar police to abide by the plans for integration. The Croatian police have made a few concessions when we applied enough pressure through the western European representatives in Zagreb, but we still don't have a separate document regarding a unique police force sought in the memorandum of agreement.

After few months of negotiations, just one agreement about the first phase was signed on 31 march 1995. The present status of its implementation shows a mixed picture: establishment of a common operations center, improvement of the communication systems, common patrols, as well as supervision of local police forces have been achieved, but still only on the basis of separate forces. However, in the last few weeks, at least we have achieved better cooperation between the two sides. Two agreements came from this regarding combined investigations of a motor vehicle robbery and the supervision of prisoners. But these improvements of cooperation are miles away from a unique police force.

Public safety

The need for a unique police force is urgent because Mostar is facing, mostly on the western side, serious threats from organized crime. Well known groups of criminals, in some cases linked to military units, are involved in armed robberies as well as more typical forms of organized crime like extortion and smuggling. Despite the assurances of the local Croatian leaders and the Croatian government, these activities and the presence of these gangs on the streets of Mostar continue without effective counter-measures.

Displaced persons and refugees

The process of return to Mostar and to the federation as a whole is still blocked from the Croatian side, where there is insufficient political will to allow the return of exiled Muslims. In contrast, we have witnessed occasional expulsions of Muslims from their homes in western Mostar. In the first year of the European union Mostar administration only a few cases of reunion of families for humanitarian purposes [elderly people] have been allowed by the government of west Mostar.

We have started a special residential program in order to improve conditions for the return of refugees into their original homes. But it is more than doubtful that the Croatian side will go along with the first phase, involving the return of Croatian refugees to the Bosnian side, as the Bosnians have offered.

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The unification of the 2 administrations

We have started the negotiations with both sides that have been represented by the major political parties: the HDZ and SDA (Muslim-dominated party of democratic action) about the future political organization of Mostar. As a result, we have proposed a structure based on 3 principles:

- The Mostar municipality must legally maintain an integrated administration, responsible for the implementation of common tasks; among the central tasks shall be budgeting, taxation, urban planning, and infrastructural development
- The tasks of greatest local importance are as follows: education, culture, sport, and social services; these shall be delegated to the city's neighborhood councils
- Citizens of Mostar shall directly elect city council members for all of Mostar as well as representatives to local neighborhood councils

As expected, the Croatian party has given their own proposal that would divide the Mostar city into two legally independent units: one Croatian, one Muslim, leaving some space for a unspecified form of cooperation between the two sides.

The proposal of the HDZ is a formal proof and confirmation of the politics of the division of Mostar. It is contrary to the text and the spirit of the memorandum of understanding and is therefore unacceptable. One could hastily say that the Croatian proposal is only a prelim offer. The Bosnians, on the other hand, demand an integrated Mostar, but their own proposal has elements of the old Yugoslav system and is therefore no basis for consensus. We must expect long-term negotiations before we make Croats accept Mostar as an integrated unit. I shall speak to both president Izetbegovic and president Tudjman, along with local leaders of the federation about a compromise solution.

Prospects and conclusion

Commonly it is accepted that Mostar is the most critical point in the Bosnian-Croatian federation. The general progress of the two partners in this situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not offer enough impetus for political compromise in Mostar. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the efforts of the European union Mostar administration and its mere presence has initiated processes of normalization both to the local population and to visitors.

We have defined a strategy of targets and common guidelines for the second year of our administration, lasting until July 1996. This strategic document has been submitted to the presidency of the federation. We shall use its guidelines to achieve the goals of our mandate, but it is obvious that our political target --a unique, integrated, independent, and multiethnic administration for Mostar-- shall not be achieved without support of [European] governments.